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ABSTRACT
Bayesian networks are powerful tools in system reliability assessment due to their
flexibility in modeling the reliability structure of complex systems. This dissertation
develops Bayesian network models for system reliability analysis through the use of
Bayesian inference techniques.
Bayesian networks generalize fault trees by allowing components and subsystems
to be related by conditional probabilities instead of deterministic relationships; thus,
they provide analytical advantages to the situation when the failure structure is not
well understood, especially during the product design stage. In order to tackle this
problem, one needs to utilize auxiliary information such as the reliability information
from similar products and domain expertise. For this purpose, a Bayesian network
approach is proposed to incorporate data from functional analysis and parent prod-
ucts. The functions with low reliability and their impact on other functions in the
network are identified, so that design changes can be suggested for system reliability
improvement.
A complex system does not necessarily have all components being monitored at
the same time, causing another challenge in the reliability assessment problem. Some-
times there are a limited number of sensors deployed in the system to monitor the
states of some components or subsystems, but not all of them. Data simultaneously
collected from multiple sensors on the same system are analyzed using a Bayesian
network approach, and the conditional probabilities of the network are estimated
by combining failure information and expert opinions at both system and compo-
nent levels. Several data scenarios with discrete, continuous and hybrid data (both
discrete and continuous data) are analyzed. Posterior distributions of the reliability
parameters of the system and components are assessed using simultaneous data.
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Finally, a Bayesian framework is proposed to incorporate different sources of
prior information and reconcile these different sources, including expert opinions
and component information, in order to form a prior distribution for the system.
Incorporating expert opinion in the form of pseudo-observations substantially sim-
plifies statistical modeling, as opposed to the pooling techniques and supra Bayesian
methods used for combining prior distributions in the literature. The methods pro-
posed are demonstrated with several case studies.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
Due to the increasing rate of introduction of new products in today’s marketplace,
it is becoming more and more important to satisfy the consumers’ demands, which
requires that the products be highly reliable. As the demand of reliability is strictly
increasing, achieving high quality and reliability has become a default requirement
during a product’s life cycle. The complexity of engineered products have also in-
creased vastly over the last decades; therefore, the need to develop efficient methods
for reliability assessment and building tools to incorporate these methods into the
product’s life cycle is undeniable and a lot of researchers and engineers have worked
on reliability assessment of complex systems to achieve good reliable products.
Therefore this dissertation aims to address the reliability assessment problem and
presents Bayesian network approaches for two research problems: early system re-
liability during functional design stage and system reliability assessment with incom-
plete and overlapping data. A third problem this research addresses is how to com-
bine prior information from diverse sources for reliability assessment in a Bayesian
framework. Systems are getting more and more complex due to added functional-
ities; therefore, traditional methods like fault trees and reliability diagrams are not
capable of analyzing these complex systems properly. As a result, there is a need for
a method to model and analyze complex systems and evaluate the system reliability
by incorporating information from different sources.
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The first challenge for the research problems mentioned above is the lack of
complete compatible system reliability information. A complex system is usually
composed of sub-systems and components, structured in a hierarchy. In addition,
information comes from multiple levels of the system in different forms. In most of
the cases in real life, we do not have complete information coming from all levels of
the system. We propose a Bayesian network methodology to incorporate available
information into the system and component reliability assessment processes. Espe-
cially, during the design stage of a system, we may not have the detailed knowledge
of all possible failure mechanisms of the system, and the scarcity and poor quality of
reliability data during the design phase might be very problematic. In these cases, we
would like to learn more about the interactions between components and how they
work together and the effects of these interactions on system reliability.
Bayesian networks (BNs) have significant advantages over traditional reliability
assessmentmethods due to their efficiency in evaluating associations and simplicity in
providing a system assessment. They are very efficient at propagating the uncertainty
and updating the system with new data in the network. They are also applicable when
system structures are too complex to be represented by fault trees or reliability block
diagrams. As fault trees and reliability block diagrams model the system’s reliability-
wise structure in a deterministic way, they are in general ill-suited for a conceptual
design where even the components of system and their configurations have not been
determined. Bayesian network, on the other hand, can model the uncertainties in
various system functions and the generating processes of system functions, thus it
is a viable tool for studying product reliability at its early design stages. Therefore,
the purpose of this research is to gain reliability insight starting from early stages of
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the design of a new product using different sources of information using a Bayesian
network framework.
1.2 Motivation
Reliability prediction at a product’s very early design stages has been gaining atten-
tion over the last decade. Build-in-reliability (BIR) and design-for-reliability (DFR)
philosophies have been a great influence on the necessity to estimate the reliability of
a product during its conceptual design phase. However, predicting reliability during
the conceptual design stage is challenging, as the available knowledge is very limited
and it is descriptive and qualitative in nature.
Bayesian network models have been proved to be powerful tools that provide
important advantages over traditional techniques in early reliability assessment. Tra-
ditional methods, such as fault trees or reliability block diagrams, do not show enough
flexibility to capture the uncertainties in the dependencies among components and
the system. Bayesian networks are modeled by conditional probabilities instead of
deterministic “AND” and “OR” relationships, providing a probabilistic measure of
dependencies between components and the system. They are especially useful during
the early stage of product design process when we are not sure about the reliability
structure of a complex system. When we use Bayesian inference techniques for pa-
rameter estimation, BNs provide a very efficient framework for combining informa-
tion from multiple sources and multiple levels for system reliability assessment. As
a result, we aim to use BN models and Bayesian inference together for dependency
assessment in system reliability. BNs can effectively address the uncertainty in all
stages of the product life cycle due to their probabilistic structure and they can solve
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complex problems due to advancements in simulation-based computing techniques,
making them very favorable to work with.
Reliability assessment techniques in the early stages of the product development
process have been studied extensively in the past few decades. Most of these ap-
proaches are centered on component-specific failures (Kurtoglu and Tumer, 2008;
Stone and Wood, 2000; Derelöv, 2008). These studies mostly focused on the func-
tional design stage, and they were descriptive and qualitative in nature. Sanchez and
Pan (2011) provided statistical inference on the failure rate of a new design, emphasiz-
ing the value of reliability prediction at a product’s very early design stage. However,
their study also analyzed the failure causes of components individually. With the
advent of highly complex systems that derive functionalities from multiple domains,
more emphasis is required on identifying failures arising due to various interactions
among components, which is largely absent in existing failure analysis approaches.
There are many mechanisms through which failures occur in any given system.
One typical example of a complex failure mechanism is carburetor icing in internal
combustion engines (ICE), which results due to the freezing of air moisture dur-
ing the suction of highly humid air through the carburetor (Augustine et al., 2012).
An ICE has many components and these components all interact with each other.
We need to understand how these interactions affect the working mechanism of the
system in order to gain an understanding of the reliability structure. However, assess-
ment of these interactions in early stages of product development is limited due to
the general non-availability of hard numerical data and representative mathematical
relationships. There exist very few techniques that support effective identification
of failure mechanisms at the design stage and help generate an understanding of the
early reliability.
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Many advantages can be gained by beginning the reliability analysis of a new de-
sign at the conceptual design stage. The main advantage comes from arriving at a
more reliable product without the need for multiple redesigns in order to eliminate
failure modes in advanced stages of the design process, as happens in the traditional
approaches such as FMEA. Reliability for any product or service is crucial. It be-
comes even more crucial for those complex systems that cannot fail, such as military
weapon systems, aerospace systems, automotive systems and nuclear systems. For
new products in these applications, reliability must be considered in the design phase
to meet all the requirements given the high risks in case of failure.
In the early stages of product design, traditional reliability information is scarce.
Many studies in literature assess complex system reliability with complete indepen-
dent data. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to develop methods to incorporate
available information to assess system reliability. There might be different sources
of data that provide reliability information while designing a new product and these
data might be available from different components or different levels of the system,
as complex systems are usually structured in hierarchical levels. As another example,
we can think of a contaminant reduction device (CRD) used in automotive industry
(Sanchez, 2014; Yontay et al., 2015). If we would like to propose improvements on
the existing design to comply with some regulations, we will have to evaluate several
design options. Since the development of the CRD is in the conceptual design phase,
the data for the new model is scarce. In this scenario, using a Bayesian network to
create a graphical model of the design parameters (functions of the system) and com-
bine whatever information is available from the previous designs (parent products)
is crucial in assessing the early reliability of the device because of the uncertainty in-
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volved in the design. We can then compare different design options using the early
reliability analysis using a Bayesian network framework and choose the best design.
Motivated by the above-mentioned facts, this dissertation presents Bayesian net-
work methods for system reliability assessment of complex systems. The main moti-
vation for this research is to address the gap in the area of addressing the dependen-
cies in a system using incomplete and simultaneous data due to the fact that recent
research on BNs has mostly focused on using complete and independent data for
system reliability assessment.
1.3 Overview of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 proposes a
Bayesian network approach to incorporate data from functional analysis and parent
products in order to analyze the relationships among the functions of a system dur-
ing design stage. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 look into the system in more detail and
these chapters are devoted to learning the parameters of a Bayesian network with
incomplete simultaneous data. Chapter 5 focuses on incorporating different sources
of prior information using a Bayesian model. Finally, in Chapter 6, we summarize
the contributions of our research and discuss further research directions in this area.
More specifically, in Chapter 2, we focus on the concept of integrating the prod-
uct design information from functional analysis with the product failure information
derived from other sources. A product failure is defined as when one or more of
its designed functions cannot be executed as expected. Failure modes can be stated
in terms of deviation of functions. Thus, we use functional analysis to reveal a pre-
liminary reliability structure for the product and to create a BN. The nodes of BN
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are the designed functions and their corresponding failure modes. The conditional
dependencies among these nodes are extracted from engineering experience, expert
opinions, and the failure data from historical failure occurrence of the same function
in similar (parent) products.
In Chapter 3, we present a Bayesian network approach for evaluating the con-
ditional probability of failure within a complex system, using a multilevel system
configuration. The novel feature of this model is that Bayesian network (BN) is used
to represent the probabilistic relationship between system and component reliability,
which is a generalization of the deterministic relationship usually modeled by fault
trees and reliability block diagrams. The model allows incorporating simultaneous
discrete data coming from several sensors in the system and can provide an initial
analysis of the dependency structure in system reliability especially when the failure
structure is not well known. The methodology is illustrated with three different sce-
narios, each scenario demonstrating our Bayesian methodology by using data coming
from different system levels.
In Chapter 4, we extend the main ideas in Chapter 3 to the incomplete and con-
tinuous failure time data, in which case the Bayesian inference becomes much more
challenging. In this case, we propose a Bayesian network approach for assessing the
time-to-failure distribution parameters of the components and for predicting early
reliability of the system and components over time. Our model allows us to incorpo-
rate incomplete and simultaneous life time data from several sensors in the system
and it is applicable to any lifetime distribution. We also extend the case to the hybrid
data structures, where we have both discrete and continuous data. We illustrate the
methodology through a demonstrative example.
Chapter 5 is devoted on combining multiple sources of prior information for the
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system. The aim of our research in this chapter is to obtain prior data from the sys-
tem and components, in addition to using expert opinion effectively and combining
these different streams of information to derive prior distributions for the parame-
ters of the Bayesian model. Specifying prior distributions in a Bayesian network is an
important part of the modeling process. We plan to develop a method that allows
us to incorporate non-observed, subjective and legacy information, such as expert
opinions, historical data and specifications from similar products, into the model
efficiently.
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Chapter 2
BAYESIAN NETWORKS FOR RELIABILITY PREDICTION IN
FUNCTIONAL DESIGN STAGE
2.1 Introduction
Reliability prediction at a product’s very early design stages has been gaining atten-
tion over the last decades. Build-in-reliability (BIR) and design-for-reliability (DFR)
philosophies have been a great influence on the necessity to estimate the reliability of
a product during its conceptual design phase. However, predicting reliability during
the conceptual design stage is challenging, as the available knowledge is very limited
and it is descriptive and qualitative in nature.
Probabilistic methods for the system reliability assessment of a product design
have been used extensively by reliability engineers. These modeling techniques
mostly utilize measures like mean time to failure (MTTF), failure rate and failure
distributions obtained by some life tests conducted in the detailed design stage. How-
ever, reliability should be incorporated into the product life cycle as early as possible
and maintained throughout the cycle to ensure good quality of a product (Pahl and
Beitz, 2013). The acceleration of product development speed and the reduction of
product’s life cycle cost are the major benefits that can be gained by beginning the
failure analysis of a new product at its conceptual design stage, in particular during
its functional analysis. Traditional approaches like FMEA, fault trees and reliabil-
ity block diagrams (RBD) could only be implemented after a detailed design of the
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product has been carried out; therefore, they are not well suited for product reliability
predict at early design stages.
Bayesian networks (BNs) have significant advantages over traditional reliability
assessmentmethods due to their efficiency in evaluating associations and simplicity in
providing a system assessment. They are very efficient at propagating the uncertainty
and updating the system with new data in the network. They are also applicable when
system structures are too complex to be represented by fault trees or reliability block
diagrams. As fault trees and reliability block diagrams model the system’s reliability-
wise structure in a deterministic way, they are in general ill-suited for a conceptual
design where even the components of system and their configurations have not been
determined. Bayesian network, on the other hand, can model the uncertainties in
various system functions and the generating processes of system functions, thus it is
a viable tool for studying product reliability at its early design stages.
This chapter focuses on the concept of integrating the product design informa-
tion from functional analysis with the product failure information derived from other
sources. A product failure is defined as when one or more of its designed functions
cannot be executed as expected. Failure modes can be stated in terms of deviation
of functions. Thus, we use functional analysis to reveal a preliminary reliability struc-
ture for the product and to create a BN. A typical BN model consists of two parts:
a direct acyclic graph (DAG) modeling presentation and conditional probability ta-
bles between parent and child nodes. The nodes of BN are the designed functions
and their corresponding failure modes. The conditional dependencies among these
nodes can be extracted from engineering experience, expert opinions, and the fail-
ure data from historical failure occurrence of the same function in similar (parent)
products. The chapter is organized as follows: A literature review is provided in
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Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents specific descriptions of the framework introducing
functional analysis and Bayesian networks. Our proposed methodology is described
in Section 2.4, followed by a case study in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 draws the
conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
System reliability can be defined as the probability that a system will perform its
intended function for a specified period of time under stated conditions. Analytical
methods, with the assistance of graphical tools such as fault trees, reliability block
diagrams and network graphs, are frequently used to estimate system reliability.
In literature, the idea of using BNs for system reliability assessment was discussed
by several studies (Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007; Ma-
hadevan et al., 2001). Mahadevan et al. (2001) proposed themethodologies of applying
BNs to structural system reliability assessment with multiple failure sequences. Bob-
bio et al. (2001) and Boudali and Dugan (2006) also proposed BNs as the alternatives
to traditional reliability estimation approaches. Doguc and Ramirez-Marquez (2009)
presented a holistic method for constructing a BN model for estimating system re-
liability. They introduced a method that uses historical data and provided efficient
techniques for construction of the BN model.
The aforementioned studies were conducted at existing products with the avail-
ability of product failure data. There are very few studies implementing reliability-
based design at the very early product design stage. Clark and Paasch (1996) de-
scribed a diagnostic modeling methodology in the conceptual design phase. Their
method was based on the relationship between a system’s functions and the failure
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modes of components. Eubanks et al. (1997) proposed a method to address reliability
during the early stages of design. They utilized behavior modeling to identify failures
with the help of function-structure relationships and then analyzed the effects of
these failures. Derelöv (2008) proposed a qualitative framework of potential failure
identification in a conceptual design. He modeled the system in a qualitative and
deterministic way. Huang and Jin (2008) addressed the gap between reliability and
design, and developed a conceptual strength interference theory by parameterizing
the conceptual design space via introducing reliability-related parameters into func-
tional design. Due to the lack of direct reliability information in the early design stage,
some unconventional sources of reliability information need to be explored. Even so,
how to integrate objective and subjective information from disparate sources in a sys-
tematic way is still a challenging task. Sanchez and Pan (2011) presented an enhanced
parenting process for predicting reliability of a new product by using the reliability
information of parent products. They relied on expert elicitation for assessing the
effects on design changes on individual failure causes.
Product functional analysis is a critical step in the product conceptual design.
Qian and Gero (1996) presented an approach of using the associations between func-
tion, behavior and structure to build a formal structure. Stone and Wood (2000)
introduced a consistent design language, called a functional basis, in which they pro-
vided clear definitions for each function and flow. Otto and Wood (1998) discussed
various techniques in product design and development that address conceptual for-
mulation, and functional design issues. Hirtz et al. (2002) provided a set of function
bases in order to standardize and formalize function structure design, modeling and
evaluation. Sridharan and Campbell (2005) presented an approach to developing the
graph grammar for function structures. In addition, Chandrasekaran et al. (1993) used
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functional representation (FR) to define the design space, describing the overall func-
tion first, and then the behavior of each component with respect to that function.
They presented FR as a good framework for capturing the casual components in
performing the product’s functions. Wang and Jin (2002) proposed an analytical ap-
proach to functional design by introducing a new concept, called function-behavior,
and developing a BN based analysis method. The function-failure design method,
developed by Tumer and Stone (2001), relates failure modes to product functions. It
can be utilized for the conceptual design of new products or the redesign of existing
products.
In general, the existing methods are largely qualitative and the function-failure
relationships are often represented by a matrix, which is inadequate for modeling
failure-cause dynamics and for representing the intricate connections amongmultiple
functional failure modes and their causes. We propose a methodology of transferring
functional analysis to BNs such that the quantitative analysis of a new product’s
reliability could be performed even at its early design stage.
2.3 Background and Framework
2.3.1 Conceptual Design
Conceptual design is the first phase of design, providing a description of the
proposed system through a set of concepts about its functionalities. A conceptual
design utilizes concept and function structure formulations corresponding to func-
tional requirements for the product. It does not address the detailed information
about physical components.
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The tasks of conceptual design are defined differently in various sources in litera-
ture. But according to the definition of the design process by Pahl and Beitz (2013),
the stages of a conceptual design are:
• Identify customer requirements.
• Decompose the customer requirements into design requirements.
• Establish functional structures.
• Generate candidate conceptual design solutions.
• Evaluate the design concepts and the functional structures for the detailed de-
sign stage.
As a result, the conceptual design phase generates the concepts that will be im-
plemented during the next stages of the product design. Function structures are
used during conceptual design to transform the customer requirements into specific
functional tasks.
2.3.2 Functional Analysis
Functional design is an important step in the product design process. The lack
of analysis for functional design is a factor that can cause inefficient and unreliable
designs. The problems might not be detected until the embodiment design, which
might be costly and time consuming.
In early stages of design, system failures are identified as failure to achieve one or
more predefined functions, and a functional model of a system is simply a graphical
representation of the system functionality, without any details of the structure (Otto
andWood, 1998). In the initial stages of design, based on the customer requirements,
an overall function for the design can be identified, which includes the flows of
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energy, material and signal of the function. This overall function is then broken
down into sub-functions with less complexity but more details (Tumer and Stone,
2001). In order to effectively represent functions and sub-functions, a standardized
modeling language is required. Various studies have been conducted on a generic
functional basis for functional modeling (Hirtz et al., 2002).
Failure of a system is defined as the termination of the ability of the system to
complete its intended function. Thus, a system failure mode can be correlated to
functions of components. If this correlation can be established, then failure modes
can be eliminated or significantly reduced by improving component quality or recon-
figuring system reliability structure. This is the fundamental logic behind the system
reliability improvement using FTA or FMEA. Following the same logic, in functional
analysis a function failure is caused by the interruption of material, energy and signal
flows. Different design concepts may cause different types of interruption, which
are the failure causes that designer should be aware of. When a new product is being
designed, its intended functionalities will be matched to the functionalities of exist-
ing products, so the designer can generate several design options to materialize the
intended function. Therefore, the new design will inherit the failure mode from its
parent products and the reliability prediction for the intended function will become
possible by combining the failure information from parent products and from expert
opinions.
2.3.3 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network (BN) consists of two main parts:
• Qualitative part: consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the nodes
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represent random variables (continuous or discrete) and directed arcs repre-
senting causal relationships between the random variables.
• Quantitative part: conditional probability tables between parent and child
nodes.
In a BN, the nodes without any arrows directed into them are called root nodes
and they are described according to their marginal probability distributions. The
nodes that have arrows directed into them are called child nodes and the nodes that
have arrows directed from them are called parent nodes. Each child has a conditional
probability table associated with it, given the values of parent nodes.
Consider a BN over variables X1; X2; : : : ; Xn. By the chain rule of probability
theory, the joint probability P (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) is
P (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) =
nY
i=1
P (Xi j pa(Xi)) (2.1)
where pa(Xi) is the set of parents of node Xi.
Certain nodes in a BN may become uncorrelated if there is no link between these
nodes. This situation is called conditional independence. These conditional inde-
pendences allow us to decrease the number of terms in the chain rule, providing a
simpler structure.
BNs can be utilized to model function structures where the nodes are represented
by the designed functions and their corresponding failure modes. The conditional
dependencies among these nodes can be extracted from engineering experience, ex-
pert opinions, and the failure data from historical failure occurrence from existing
products with similar functions.
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2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 BNs from Functional Analysis
A product’s functions are typically determined based on customer requirements,
as well as marketing analysis. A rigorous functional analysis provides the possible
failure causes from material, energy and signal aspects that can be utilized for con-
structing Bayesian networks. It needs to be emphasized that in early design stages
it is the product function, instead of component, to be analyzed, as individual com-
ponents will only be materialized in a later design stage. For example, assuming that
a functional failure is caused by four possible direct causes as shown in Figure 1, a
designer can select different design options (e.g., choosing different function gener-
ating mechanisms or different components) during the embodiment design process
so that some failure causes can be avoided. In functional analysis, all possible causes
for a functional failure are elicited. They are, in general, structured hierarchically,
extended to multiple levels. For simplicity, Figure 1 only shows one level, i.e., the
direct causes to a functional failure.
Figure 1. A simple BN from functional analysis
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2.4.2 Conditional Probability Table
In a discrete BN each node may take values from several states. For example, the
function node in Figure 1, F1, have two states, 1 or 0, corresponding to failure or
success. However, a node, in general, can have more than two states. For example,
let the direct parent node, C1, in Figure 1 be the material strength, then its states
can be assigned as Strong, Medium or Weak. Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs)
are needed to quantify the probabilistic relationships between nodes; i.e., to specify
Pr(F1 j C1; C2; C3; C4) in Figure 1. This is not addressed in a typical functional
analysis. We propose two approaches to the quantification problem by integrating
available data about a function and subjective assessment from experts.
2.4.3 With Complete Function Log Data
Consider a single function and two direct causes that govern the successful execu-
tion of this function. Given two states to each cause and the CPT as shown in Table
1, there are four parameters, p1; p2; p3; p4, that need to be specified. Although it is
uncommon in practice, we start our discussion with this naïve scenario – a complete
historical dataset of the states of the function and its direct causes is available. This
is possible if this function and its associated causes are continuously monitored by
sensors and the log data from existing products that perform the same function can
be obtained.
Using all observed instances of function states and cause states it is straightfor-
ward to obtain the estimation of the conditional failure probability given a combina-
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tion of cause states. For the previous example,
pi = Pr(F = 1 j C1i; C2i) =
P
k Ik(F = 1; C1i; C2i)P
k Ik(C1i; C2i)
(2.2)
where the denominator is the total number of instances of the specific combination
of C1 and C2 and the numerator is the number of instances of function failure at
this combination.
Table 1. Conditional probability table.
C1 C2 Pr(F = 1 j C1; C2) Pr(F = 0 j C1; C2)
0 0 p1 1  p1
0 1 p2 1  p2
1 0 p3 1  p3
1 1 p4 1  p4
However, even this simple formula could become troublesome in practice when
there are many states for each cause node. In such case, the number of combinations
grows large, thus the log file could be highly fragmented. There might be no observa-
tion for a particular combination. Therefore, it is better to combine Eq. 2.2 with the
expert’s opinion on how many function failure may happen for a given parent nodes
combination. This is equivalent to assign a prior distribution to the function failure
probability. Assume a Beta prior distribution, Beta(ai; bi), for pi, then the posterior
estimation of pi is given by
pi =
P
k Ik(F = 1; C1i; C2i) + aiP
k Ik(C1i; C2i) + (ai + bi)
(2.3)
where (ai + bi) is the equivalent sample size in the prior and ai is the equivalent
number of failures in prior samples.
Therefore, in the expert opinion elicitation process, two questions would be
asked: In your experience, how frequent this type of combination of C1 and C2
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may happen? And, in your experience, what is the chance of function failure given
this type of combination of C1 and C2? The prior parameters, ai and bi, can be
derived from the answers of these questions. By combining expert assessments and
historical data, a robust conditional failure probability can be obtained.
2.4.4 With Function Failure Records
A function failure record is often maintained within an organization and it is the
most common type of information that one can track for assessing the function
failure probability. For example, given a checklist such as Table 2, we can see that
function F1 failed once due to C1 and C2, and F2 failed once due to C3, etc.
Table 2. Function failure records.
Function C1 C2 C3
F1 X X
F2 X
: : : : : : : : : : : :
Notice that given these records, we can estimate the probability of failure causes
given a failure mode; i.e., Pr(C1; C2 j F1), but not the probability of a failure mode
given failure causes. This is because, unlike the log data, Table 2 records only failure
events. To obtain the conditional probability of failure given causes, we need to have
the probability of occurrence of cause combination and the marginal probability of
failure, because
Pr(F j C1; C2) = Pr(C1; C2 j F )Pr(F )
Pr(C1; C2)
(2.4)
Expert opinions on these marginal probabilities (Pr(F ) and Pr(C1; C2)) can be
solicited. Experts are asked what the chance of a function failure is during the prod-
uct’s lifetime and what the chance of a cause state combination is. This can be ob-
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tained by directly estimating the occurrence rate of these events, then converting
them to event probabilities based on exponential distribution. That is,
Pr(F ) = 1  e F t (2.5)
Pr(C1; C2) = 1  e C1;C2t (2.6)
where F and C1;C2 are the occurrence rate of function failure event and cause com-
bination event, respectively, and t is the product lifetime.
This approach is an extension of the parenting process presented by Sanchez and
Pan (2011), in which only the probability of one failure mode given one failure cause
was discussed. That is, they assumed that the effects of failure causes are indepen-
dent to each other. Here, we generalize it to a general case without independence
assumption.
2.5 A Case Study
A new contaminant reduction device (CRD) is being introduced for use in an
automotive industry. A CRD is used to convert toxic exhaust emissions into less-
toxic substances. A chemical reaction is stimulated through the exhaust flow and
then contaminants are reduced in the system before the gas is released. Using func-
tional analysis approach, some function structures are analyzed for the system. The
functions to be represented by the Bayesian network are listed as follows:
• Flow of exhaust gas
• Injection of fluid
• Chemical reaction of catalysis
• Amount of contaminants
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• Back pressure at outlet
• Filtering of the substances
It is assumed that the new CRD maintains the same failure structure as the pre-
vious designs; hence, information from the previous CRD products can be used to
form the functional relationships. The function failure record from the parent prod-
ucts is analyzed and is combined with expert elicitation.
Our aim is to assess the product’s reliability at the conceptual design stage. We use
the methodology presented in this research to create a graphical model for capturing
the relationships between the main functions of the system. The basic functional
structure of the product is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The relationship between the main functions
The next step is to obtain the conditional probability table for each node. The
states of each node are expressed in binary variables: “1” for function failure and
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“0” for function performing properly. Figure 3 shows the conditional probability
tables for each node obtained using the failure records from parent products and
then eliciting expert opinions to calculate the new failure rates for each function.
Figure 3. Conditional probability tables
Hugin Lite 8.0 was used for propagating the information through the network.
The initial analysis of marginal distribution for each node shows that the key func-
tion, filtering of substances, is functional only 73% of the time. In order to find
the probability distributions given that the filtering is not functioning, the evidence
was propagated using the software and the back pressure node was found to be the
function highly associated with the filter malfunction.
Figure 4 shows the impact of the state of back pressure on the distribution of
filtering. It is obvious from the figure that it is very important that the back pressure
at outlet must function properly so that the filtering could function properly too.
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Figure 4. Evidence analysis of filter function failure
In this case study, the Bayesian network approach is able to provide the design
team the information about which function parameters needed to be improved to
meet the design specifications. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis is utilized for assist-
ing an objective decision making process. As a result, the changes in the design are
justified as they provide a more robust CRD.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we propose to model system reliability using Bayesian network at
the system’s early design stage. The key idea is to utilize the reliability information
of parent products that was stored as a function failure record. The relationships
between failure modes and failure causes can be found from these historical records.
Expert elicitation is also used in order to account for the changes from the parent
products. Integrating both objective and subjective reliability information, we pro-
vide insights for the early reliability prediction problem. In our approach, the first
step is the functional analysis of the system. It is necessary to identify and establish
the relationships between the functions and a BN is constructed. Using belief prop-
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agation, the designer is able to evaluate the impact of different design scenarios on
the system reliability of a conceptual design.
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Chapter 3
A COMPUTATIONAL BAYESIAN APPROACH TO DEPENDENCY
ASSESSMENT IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY
3.1 Introduction
Due to increasing demands of product functionality, engineered products have
become more and more complex over time. The traditional reliability assessment
methods for simple systems are often inadequate in analyzing more complex systems.
Conducting full system tests is often too expensive to be implemented on such sys-
tems. This situation calls for a method to develop reliability models for complex
systems and to integrate all available information for predicting system reliability.
There are situations that we do not have complete information of how a complex
system would fail in its operating environment. We would like to learn more about
the interaction between the system and its components and how they work together.
In this chapter, we use Bayesian network (BN) to represent the probabilistic relation-
ship between system and component reliability, which is a natural extension of the
deterministic relationship typically modeled by block diagrams or fault trees when
the failure structure is well understood.
The BN model has been proved to be a powerful tool that provides important
methodological advantages over traditional techniques in reliability assessment. Tra-
ditional methods, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram, are still common
representation in system reliability analysis; however, they are not flexible enough
to capture the uncertainties in the dependencies among component, subsystem, and
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system (see Bobbio et al. (2001); Mahadevan et al. (2001); Boudali and Dugan (2006);
Langseth and Portinale (2007); Wilson and Huzurbazar (2007)). BNs generalize fault
trees by allowing components and subsystems to be related by conditional probabil-
ities instead of deterministic “AND” and “OR” relationships; thus, they provide
analytical advantages to the situation when we are not sure about the reliability struc-
ture of a complex system, especially during the early stage of product design process.
Another important advantage of BN over the traditional approach is its ability of
combining information from multiple sources at multiple levels for system reliability
prediction, especially when the BN model is coupled with statistical Bayesian infer-
ence techniques. As a result, it is worthwhile to explore the use of BN model and
Bayesian inference together for the dependency assessment in system reliability.
A BNmodel requires conditional probabilities to model the dependencies among
components, subsystems, and systems. These conditional probabilities are capable
of representing complex, probabilistic failure relationships in a multilevel system con-
figuration. In a complex system, the failure relationship between system and compo-
nent could be significantly more complicated than a typical series or parallel system,
especially when the specific failure cause and failure mechanism has yet been under-
stood, such as in a newly developed system (Sanchez and Pan, 2011). Therefore,
investigating the conditional probability table of BN model can help engineers to
sort out the unknown influential factors, if there are any.
The conditional probabilities in a BN model can be estimated by combining in-
formation from different sources. There are objective information sources, such
as failures of older generation products, life test of component, and available field
data, and there are subjective sources too, such as expert opinions. These data come
with different types and different structures, causing difficulties in the estimation of
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conditional probability. Furthermore, a system evolves over time, so assigning fixed
values to these probabilities limits the flexibility to account for the evolution process
of system development. Therefore, we choose Bayesian inference for parameter es-
timation in the BN model. Bayesian inference is a statistical inference method that
enables model parameter estimation by deriving the posterior distribution from a
combination of prior distribution and likelihood function. It allows us to integrate
both the prior information of model parameter and the data coming from different
sources for model inference; therefore, we can obtain more precise estimation of BN
model parameter.
The goal of this chapter is to develop the methodology of estimating conditional
probabilities in a BN model using Bayesian inference so that the reliability-relevant
information from different sources at different reliability structure levels of a com-
plex system can be combined together. The next section presents a literature review
of BN model and Bayesian inference. Our BN framework for system reliability and
its inference method are discussed in Section 3.3. We start by discussing how to infer
conditional probability using a conjugate model for a simple 2-state Bayesian network
and then extend it to a multi-state model. We also briefly discuss the case where we
have only system failure records. Finally, we develop a data analysis method for the
scenario of having incomplete information from components. We illustrate the pro-
posed method with a case study in Section 3.4 and conclude the chapter in Section
3.5.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Models for Multilevel System Reliability Assessment
System reliability can be defined as the probability that a system will perform its
intended function for a specified period of time under stated conditions. Analytical
methods, with the assistance of graphical tools such as fault trees, reliability block
diagrams and network graphs, are frequently used to estimate system reliability.
One of the primary goals in system design evaluation is to predict the reliability
of the full system. A system is comprised of subsystems and components, or on
functional wise, sub-functions and elementary functions, which can be represented
by nodes in the system reliability topology. All nodes are potential source of failure.
Consequently, reliability information may come from different levels of the system
and it tends to be fragmented and heterogeneous. With data available at different sys-
tem levels, the challenge becomes how to combine them to learn about the reliability
of the system. The Bayesian method is very appealing for this challenging problem.
Martz et al. (1988) and Martz and Wailer (1990) addressed the problem of integrating
multilevel binary data from various levels of the system and expert guesses about the
reliability of system components. These papers focused on series and parallel sys-
tems, whose component failure data were modeled using binomial distributions and
beta distributions were used for the prior information at components, subsystem and
system levels. They used approximations to provide a posterior distribution for sys-
tem reliability. Several follow-up papers considered other computational Bayesian ap-
proaches to model inference and system reliability prediction. For example,Johnson
et al. (2003) proposed a hierarchical Bayes model approach to system reliability pre-
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diction. Their approach utilized Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to infer model
parameters, thus avoided analytical approximation. Hamada et al. (2004) applied the
same approach on the non-overlapping, continuous failure time data of basic and
higher-level failure events in a fault tree. Graves et al. (2007) further extended this
line of research by considering multi-state fault trees. They used Dirichlet distri-
bution to define the prior information about the probabilities of the states in the
model. In addition, Graves et al. (2008) proposed a Bayesian approach to properly
account for simultaneous multilevel data, i.e., use the simultaneous higher-level and
partial lower-level data to determine the event of component failure. In a follow-up
study, Reese et al. (2011) considered lifetime data throughout the system. They pre-
sented a Bayesian model that accommodates multiple lifetime information sources
and provided a method to model the time evolution of a system’s reliability. Wilson
et al. (2006) proposed a methodology that allowed for the combination of different
types of data at the component and system levels, and took a Bayesian approach to
the estimation of reliability measure. Wilson et al. (2011) showed how to combine
different types of reliability data with an example that had binomial data (modeled
with a logistic regression) from the system and one component, lifetime data from
another component, and degradation data from a third component. Guo (2011) dis-
cussed a unified Bayesian approach for simultaneously predicting system, subsystem,
and component reliabilities when there are pass/fail, lifetime, degradation, or expert
judgment data at any level of the system, which extended the work in Wilson et al.
(2006). However, these studies were mostly based on fault trees and reliability block
diagrams and did not cover the BN representation of system reliability.
In the system reliability literature, the idea of using BN model as the alternative
to fault tree or block diagram for representing system reliability structure has been
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discussed by many authors (e.g., Bobbio et al. (2001); Mahadevan et al. (2001); Boudali
and Dugan (2006); Langseth and Portinale (2007); Wilson and Huzurbazar (2007);
Li et al. (2014)). However, previous studies do not address the problem of assessing
reliability dependencies between system and its components. In this chapter, we will
assess these dependencies using a computational Bayesian inference method; that is,
given reliability information from multiple sources and at multiple levels of the sys-
tem, we will provide the Bayesian estimation to the conditional probability parameter
required in a BN model. The posterior distribution of conditional probability can be
used to quantify of the variability of the dependency of system reliability to its com-
ponents.
The aforementioned studies were conducted at existing products with the avail-
ability of product failure data. There are very few studies implementing reliability-
based design at the very early product design stage. Furthermore, previous studies
have not addressed the effect of simultaneous, yet incomplete, data, drawn from
different system levels, on the BN model estimation. Since we aim to measure relia-
bility dependencies within a system, datasets should be drawn simultaneously from
the system and its components. Independent datasets will not be able to capture the
dependencies within a system. However, getting simultaneous data from all compo-
nents/subsystems may not always be possible due to lack of sensors or other obser-
vation limitations, especially during the design phase. Graves et al. (2008) and Jackson
(2011) analyzed the effect of simultaneous data on system reliability prediction.
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3.2.2 Computational Methods in Bayesian Inference
The posterior distribution resulting from a complex Bayesian model often cannot
be written in a closed form. This results from the fact that the joint posterior distribu-
tion of multiple parameters in a complex model cannot be obtained analytically. This
difficulty has hindered the adoption of Bayesian reliability assessment for many years.
However, since the 1990s, advances in Bayesian computing through Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) have facilitated inference based on samples from the targeted
posterior distribution (Gelman et al., 2014). MCMC is a simulation algorithm for
performing Bayesian inference when conjugation is impossible (thus analytical result
is impossible), which is particularly useful for high-dimensional Bayesian inference.
MCMC algorithms draw samples from the joint posterior distribution of model pa-
rameters. Gibbs sampler, the most popular MCMC algorithm, relies on the fact that
samples drawn sequentially from complete conditional distributions will converge to
the joint posterior distribution as long as distribution parameters are constantly up-
dated. So, after a certain number of preliminary iterations, the samples drawn from
simulation chains can be viewed as from the targeted joint posterior distribution.
MCMC has also made the Bayesian models solvable when addressing the system
reliability problem. In the reliability literature several authors used the MCMC tech-
nique for Bayesian inference (e.g., Johnson et al. (2003); Hamada et al. (2004); Reese
et al. (2005a); Wilson et al. (2006); Graves et al. (2007); Wilson and Huzurbazar (2007);
Graves et al. (2008); Pan and Rigdon (2009); Guo (2011)). To implement MCMC,
we use WinBUGS, a statistical software for Bayesian inference (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2003).
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3.3 Methodology
In this section Bayesian inference methods are discussed for simultaneously esti-
mating conditional probabilities in a Bayesian network when data are collected from
different levels of the system. We give a brief summary about Bayesian networks, and
then present three different data scenarios with decreasing amount of available infor-
mation along these scenarios. The first scenario involves a simple 2-state Bayesian
network where all nodes and their states are recorded. We develop a conjugation
model for inferring conditional probabilities and also extend it to a multi-state BN.
In the second scenario, we discuss the case when we have only system failure records.
Lastly, we consider a scenario where only the system and a subset of components
are monitored by sensors, thus system health information is incomplete. We present
a Bayesian inference method for estimating reliability dependency in such a system.
3.3.1 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks (BNs) are probabilistic graphical models depicting condi-
tional independence relations and inducing a factorization into the joint probability
mass/density function over the network variables (Koller and Friedman, 2009). The
joint probabilities can be therefore expressed as a product of conditional probabil-
ities, one for each variable given the corresponding values of the parent values. A
Bayesian network consists of two main parts:
• Qualitative part: consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the nodes
represent random variables (continuous or discrete) and directed arcs repre-
senting causal relationships between the random variables.
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• Quantitative part: conditional probability tables between parent and child
nodes.
In a BN, the nodes without any arrows directed into them are called root nodes
and they are described according to their marginal probability distributions. The
nodes that have arrows directed into them are called child nodes and the nodes that
have arrows directed from them are called parent nodes. Each child has a conditional
probability table associated with it, given the values of parent nodes.
Consider a BN over variables X1; X2; : : : ; Xn. By the chain rule of probability,
the joint probability P (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) is
P (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) =
nY
i=1
P (Xi j pa(Xi)) (3.1)
where pa(Xi) is the set of parents of node Xi.
Certain nodes in a BN may become uncorrelated if there is no link between these
nodes. This situation is called conditional independence. These conditional inde-
pendences allow us to decrease the number of terms in the chain rule, providing a
simpler structure.
Figure 5 shows a BN with 3 nodes and 2 arcs. Each node Ci is a random variable.
If there is a directed arc from Ci to Cj , Ci is called a “parent” of Cj . An arc character-
izes the probabilistic dependency of a node on its parent nodes. That is, depending
on the values a node’s parents take on, the conditional probability distribution of
the node may be different. In this example, node C0 has 2 parents, C1 and C2. The
marginal probabilities of these parent those are listed in Table 3. Assuming binary
states for each node (functional state is 0 and dysfunctional state is 1), Table 4 shows
the conditional probability table (CPT) for each combination of the parents of C0. In
this chapter, a BN is employed to represent the cause-and-effect failure relationship
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among elements of a multilevel system, in which the final child node represent the
system and other nodes represent either components or subsystems of the system.
Figure 5. A simple 2-component system BN example
Table 3. Marginal probability tables for the BN example.
C1 = 0 C1 = 1
1  p1 p1
C2 = 0 C2 = 1
1  p2 p2
Table 4. Conditional probability table (CPT) for the BN example.
C0 = 0 C0 = 1
C1 = 0, C2 = 0 1  p00 p00
C1 = 0, C2 = 1 1  p01 p01
C1 = 1, C2 = 0 1  p10 p10
C1 = 1, C2 = 1 1  p11 p11
The parameters, p1 and p2, listed in Table 3 are the distribution parameters of
the marginal distributions (binomial) of the failure count variables of these 2 com-
ponents, while Table 4 gives the parameters used in the conditional distribution of
Eq. 3.1. A BN is fully defined if all of these parameters are specified, as the joint
distribution of all nodes, Eq. 3.2, has become analytically available. In a fault tree (or
reliability block diagram) representation of system reliability, the conditional proba-
bilities in Table 4 are already pre-specified for a given logic gate (or the block diagram
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configuration). For example, for an “AND” gate, we have p00 = p01 = p10 = 0 and
p11 = 1, while for an “OR” gate, we have p00 = 0 and p11 = p10 = p01 = 1. However,
in our BN representation, these relationships are not pre-specified, as the depen-
dency of system reliability to its components is unknown and needs to be evaluated
by the data collected from the system and from other information sources such as
expert opinions.
3.3.2 Bayesian Parameter Estimation in Bayesian Networks
In this section, we discuss Bayesian inference on model parameters in the context
of a Bayesian network. Bayesian framework requires us to specify a joint distribution
over the unknown parameters and the data instances. In this case, BN is parameter-
ized by the marginal probabilities of components and conditional probabilities of the
system given the states of the components. Suppose we want to estimate the param-
eters of the BN in Figure 5. Our network is parameterized by a parameter vector
p, where p = fp1; p2; p11; p10; p01; p00g. Given the prior distribution of this parameter
vector and the data collected from all nodes, Bayesian inference provides the poste-
rior distribution of the parameter of interest and the posterior prediction of system
or component reliability.
3.3.2.1 Complete System Log Data
Although it is uncommon in practice, we start our discussion with this naïve sce-
nario – a complete history of the states of the system and its components are available.
This is possible if this system and its components are continuously monitored by sen-
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sors and the log data from existing products can be obtained. In this example, each
historical record is a tuple C = fC(i)g = fhC0(i); C1(i); C2(i)ig for i = 1; : : : ; N that
describes a particular assignment (0 or 1) to nodes C0; C1 and C2. The likelihood
function is then given by
L(C j p) =
NY
i=1
P (C0(i); C1(i); C2(i) j p)
=
Y
i
P (C1(i) j p)P (C2(i) j p)P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i);p)
= (
Y
i
P (C1(i) j p))(
Y
i
P (C2(i) j p))(
Y
i
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i);p)) (3.2)
According to the equation above, we have a separate factor for each node. These
factors are called local likelihood functions and they depend on their corresponding
node’s conditional or marginal probability table parameters.
We can further decompose the conditional likelihood, P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i);p),
as
=
Y
C1(i)=0;C2(i)=0
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i); p00)
Y
C1(i)=0;C2(i)=1
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i); p01)
Y
C1(i)=1;C2(i)=0
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i); p10)
Y
C1(i)=1;C2(i)=1
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i); p11)
(3.3)
Assume that M [Cx0 ; Cy1 ; Cz2 ] represent the counts where C0(i) = x;C1(i) = y and
C2(i) = z (x; y; z = 0 or 1). Then, the terms in the right hand side of Eq. 3.3 can be
reduced to be
Y
C1(i)=1;C2(i)=1
P (C0(i) j C1(i); C2(i); p11) = pM [C
1
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ]
11 (1  p11)M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ] (3.4)
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As a result, the likelihood function of Eq. 3.2 becomes
L(C j p) =pM [C11 ]1 (1  p1)M [C
0
1 ]p
M [C12 ]
2 (1  p2)M [C
0
2 ]
p
M [C10 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ]
00 (1  p00)M [C
0
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ]p
M [C10 ;C
0
1 ;C
1
2 ]
01 (1  p01)M [C
0
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
1
2 ]
p
M [C10 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ]
10 (1  p10)M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ]p
M [C10 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ]
11 (1  p11)M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ] (3.5)
We can maximize the likelihood function above and get maximum likelihood
function estimates for the parameters. However, even this simple formula could
become troublesome in practice when there are many states for each component
node. In such case, the number of combinations grows exponentially and the log
file could be highly fragmented. There might be no observation for a particular
combination. Therefore, it is better to combine the likelihood with expert opinions.
This is equivalent to assigning a prior distribution to model parameter.
In this approach, we encode our prior knowledge about p with a probabilistic
distribution. We now treat p as a random variable. According to the Bayes’ formula,
the posterior distribution over parameters given the observed data is
Pr(p j C) = Pr(C j p)Pr(p)
Pr(C)
(3.6)
The term Pr(p) is the prior distribution function of p, Pr(C j p) is the likelihood
function, and Pr(C) can be viewed as a normalizing constant.
Since all model parameters are probabilities, an appropriate prior is the beta dis-
tribution. A Beta distribution is specified by two hyperparameters – a and b, which
are positive real numbers. The distribution is defined as follows:
  Beta(a; b) with pdf of p() = a 1(1  )b 1 (3.7)
where  is a normalizing constant, defined by
 =
 (a+ b)
 (a) (b)
(3.8)
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where  (x) =
R1
0
tx 1e tdt is the Gamma function.
If a beta prior distribution, Beta(ai; bi), is assumed for each pi, it is easy to shown
that the posterior distribution of p is given by
Pr(p j C) / Pr(C j p)Pr(p)
/ pM [C11 ]1 (1  p1)M [C
0
1 ]p
M [C12 ]
2 (1  p2)M [C
0
2 ]
p
M [C10 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ]
00 (1  p00)M [C
0
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ]p
M [C10 ;C
0
1 ;C
1
2 ]
01 (1  p01)M [C
0
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
1
2 ]
p
M [C10 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ]
10 (1  p10)M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ]p
M [C10 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ]
11 (1  p11)M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ]
pa1 11 (1  p1)b1 1pa2 12 (1  p2)b2 1pa00 100 (1  p00)b00 1
pa01 101 (1  p01)b01 1pa10 110 (1  p10)b10 1pa11 111 (1  p11)b11 1
= p
a1+M [C11 ] 1
1 (1  p1)b1+M [C
0
1 ] 1pa2+M [C
1
2 ] 1
2 (1  p2)b2+M [C
0
2 ] 1
p
a00+M [C10 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ] 1
00 (1  p00)b00+M [C
0
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
0
2 ] 1pa01+M [C
1
0 ;C
0
1 ;C
1
2 ] 1
01
(1  p01)b01+M [C00 ;C01 ;C12 ] 1pa10+M [C
1
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ] 1
10 (1  p10)b10+M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
0
2 ] 1
p
a11+M [C10 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ] 1
11 (1  p11)b11+M [C
0
0 ;C
1
1 ;C
1
2 ] 1 (3.9)
Eq. 3.9 is comprised of beta distributions for all parameters in the BN. That is,
their posterior distributions are analytically available as
pi  Beta(ai +M [C1i ]; bi +M [C0i ])
pij  Beta(aij +M [C10 ; C i1; Cj2 ]; bij +M [C00 ; C i1; Cj2 ])
This result illustrates a conjugation property of the beta distribution when cou-
pled with binomial likelihood (see Koller and Friedman (2009) for more details). Ex-
act inference is possible in case of binomial likelihood (pass/fail tests) and fully ob-
served variables. In literature, beta-binomial conjugation has been extensively used
for reliability prediction (see Martz et al. (1988); Martz and Wailer (1990); Johnson
et al. (2003); Wilson and Huzurbazar (2007)).
39
We can easily extend the discussion to multi-state models. In our BN model so
far, we have assumed that all nodes have two distinct states: pass and fail. Now,
consider the system and components having multiple states; for example, k states
for the system, C0, such as f0; : : : ; k 1g, where state k 1 represents state of failure,
state 0 represents state of full functionality and the rest of the states between rep-
resent degraded states; l states for component C1 and m states for the component
C2 (see Tables 5 and 6). The likelihood function of the system can be derived from
multinomial distributions and the conjugate priors need to be specified by Dirichlet
distributions.
Table 5. Marginal probability tables for the multi-state BN example
C1 = 0 C1 = 1    C1 = l   1
p01 p
1
1    pl 11
C2 = 0 C2 = 1    C2 = m  1
p02 p
1
2    pm 12
Table 6. Conditional probability table (CPT) for the multi-state BN example.
C0 = 0 C0 = 1    C0 = k   1
C1 = 0, C2 = 0 p000 p100    pk 100
C1 = 0, C2 = 1 p001 p101    pk 101
... ... ... . . . ...
C1 = i, C2 = j p0ij p1ij    pk 1ij
... ... ... . . . ...
C1 = l   1, C2 = m  1 p0l 1;m 1 p1l 1;m 1    pk 1l 1;m 1
Note that
P
L p
L
1 = 1,
P
M p
M
2 = 1 and
P
K p
K
ij = 1 for 8i; j.
The likelihood function in this model has the same form as in Eq. 3.5. However,
since there aremultiple states, there will be a larger number of combinations of parent
nodes. The likelihood function has the following multinomial form:
L(C j p) =
Y
L
(pL1 )
M [CL1 ]
Y
M
(pM2 )
M [CM2 ]
Y
8i;j
 Y
K
(pKij )
M [CK0 ;C
i
1;C
j
2 ]
!
(3.10)
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In this case, an appropriate prior for the probabilities in the model is Dirichlet
distribution, which is a generalization of beta distribution. A Dirichlet distribution
is specified by a set of hyperparameters 1; : : : ; k, so that
  Dirichlet(1; : : : ; K) with the pdf of P () /
Y
k
k 1k (3.11)
If we assume a Dirichlet prior distribution, Dirichlet(0i ; : : : ; k 1i ), for pi, then
the posterior distribution of p is given by
P (p j C) /P (C j p)P (p)
/
Y
L
(pL1 )
M [CL1 ]
Y
M
(pM2 )
M [CM2 ]
Y
8i;j
 Y
K
(pKij )
M [CK0 ;C
i
1;C
j
2 ]
!
Y
L
(pL1 )
L1 1
Y
M
(pM2 )
M2  1
Y
8i;j
 Y
K
(pKij )
Kij 1
!
=
Y
L
(pL1 )
L1+M [C
L
1 ] 1
Y
M
(pM2 )
M2 +M [C
M
2 ] 1
Y
8i;j
 Y
K
(pKij )
Kij+M [C
K
0 ;C
i
1;C
j
2 ] 1
!
(3.12)
Eq. 3.12 is comprised of posterior Dirichlet distributions for all parameters in
the BN; that is,
pi  Dirichlet(a0i +M [C0i ]; : : : ; ak 1i +M [Ck 1i ])
pij  Dirichlet(a0ij +M [C00 ; Ci1; Cj2 ]; : : : ; ak 1ij +M [Ck 10 ; C i1; Cj2 ])
Bayesian conjugation is convenient for obtaining analytical results; however, in
most scenarios, the prior distribution may not come from a conjugation family and
the system is too complex to model with conjugate pairs. For such cases, computa-
tional Bayesian methods such as MCMC need to be employed.
It is also of research interest to examine the effect of prior distribution assumption
on posterior estimation. In general, specifying a more informative prior reduces the
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variance of the posterior distribution, resulting in a more precise estimation. There-
fore, eliciting prior distributions in Bayesian inference is rather important for rep-
resenting prior knowledge more accurately and comprehensively. However, it is
not usually a straightforward task to elicit prior distributions for the parameters of
the model and special techniques must be used. One of the most commonly used
techniques is expert elicitation, which converts an expert’s opinions into a statistical
expression of these opinions Garthwaite and O’Hagan (2000). Experts are asked to
give their opinions about quantities for the distribution parameters such as the mean,
mode and median values. As a result, we can obtain an appropriate prior for the
parameters.
Figure 6. Box plots of conditional probabilities with different prior distributions
A sensitivity analysis has been carried out using the system in Figure 6 to show the
effect of using a more informative prior. A dataset consisting of pass/fail data for all
components was simulated and used as observations for calculating the likelihood.
Beta(1; 1) and Beta(10; 10) were assigned as the priors for model parameters, sepa-
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rately. The box plots of the posterior samples of some model parameters are shown
in Figure 6. According to the results, we get more precise results when Beta(10; 10)
is used as a prior. Therefore, we would like to emphasize that special cares to these
prior distribution assignments are needed when Bayesian inference is in use.
3.3.2.2 Summarized System Failure Data
A system failure record is often maintained within an organization and it is the
most common type of information that one can track for system failure diagnosis.
In this case, once a system failure occurs, the components that are causing the failure
are identified and this event is recorded. For example, given a checklist such as Table
7, one can see that a failure event occurred once due to C1 and C2, and once due to
C1 only, etc.
Table 7. System failure records.
System - C0 C1 C2
Failure event 1  
Failure event 2 
        
Notice that, with these records, we can directly estimate the probability of com-
ponent failure given a system failure, i.e., Pr(C1; C2 j C0 = 1), but not the probability
of system failure given the states of components. This is because, unlike the log
data, Table 7 records only system failure events. The joint probability of component
states and the marginal probability of system failure are required in order to obtain
the conditional probability of system failure, because
Pr(C0 j C1; C2) = Pr(C1; C2 j C0)Pr(C0)
Pr(C1; C2)
(3.13)
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In Eq. 3.13, Pr(C0) represents the prior knowledge about system failure and
Pr(C0 j C1; C2) represents the posterior failure distribution after observing the failure
record data. Yontay et al. (2015) discussed a method for deriving the prior probability,
Pr(C0). If each failure event is recorded with its time stamp, we can use failure times
to estimate the failure rate of the system. Assuming the time to failure is exponentially
distributed, after estimating the occurrence rate of the failure events, we can then
convert failure times to event probabilities based on exponential distribution. That
is,
Pr(C0 = 1) = Pr(T < t) = 1  e F t (3.14)
where F is the occurrence rate of system failure event and t is the system lifetime.
The next step is to calculate, Pr(C1; C2 j C0), which is the likelihood for each combi-
nation of component states, using Table 7.
As an example, consider the system in Figure 5. In this scenario, the system failure
might be caused by C1 or C2, or C1 and C2 together, or the system might fail even
when both of the components are functioning (by an unknown failure cause). Given
the recorded failure times, we can obtain an initial estimate of the prior distribution
for system failure, which is defined as Beta(1:28; 1:30). The field observations of the
system, which are summarized as the counts for each combination as shown in Table
8, can be modeled by a multinomial distribution.
We ran simulations in WinBUGS and obtained the results in Table 9. Since the
system failure probability when at least one of the components is working is very
small, we can conclude that the system behaves like a parallel system. However, since
there exists an un-ignorable probability of system failure (its mean value is 0:0516 and
95% credible interval is [0:01779; 0:1019]) when both components are functional, it
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indicates some unknown factors that are influencing system reliability. As a result,
we need to conduct further investigation of these unknown factors.
Table 8. Data from a system failure record.
Cause combinations Counts
C1 = 0; C2 = 0 4
C1 = 0; C2 = 1 9
C1 = 1; C2 = 0 12
C1 = 1; C2 = 1 75
Table 9. Empirical mean, standard deviation, and quantiles for posterior failure
probabilities.
Mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
Pr(C0 = 1 j C1 = 0; C2 = 0) 0:0516 0:01779 0:03574 0:04863 0:06429 0:1019
Pr(C0 = 1 j C1 = 0; C2 = 1) 0:1002 0:05038 0:07898 0:09769 0:1186 0:1646
Pr(C0 = 1 j C1 = 1; C2 = 0) 0:1294 0:07218 0:1059 0:1271 0:1503 0:2001
Pr(C0 = 1 j C1 = 1; C2 = 1) 0:7434 0:6542 0:715 0:7451 0:7735 0:8227
This approach can also been seen as an extension of the reliability parenting pro-
cess presented in Sanchez and Pan (2011), in which the authors utilized the failure
information of old-generation products stored in a failure database.
3.3.2.3 Incomplete Lower-Level Data
One big challenge in system reliability assessment is the lack of the complete
lower-level data as presented in previous sections. A complex system does not nec-
essarily have all components or subsystems being monitored at the same time. There
can be a limited number of sensors deployed in the system to monitor the states of
some components or subsystems, but not all of them. In addition, these sensor data
are stored by sensor, not in the system format such as the row entries in Table 7.
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Since system’s functionality is conditional on the functionality of subsystems and
components, collectively analyzing these data yields significant information about
the reliability. However, data collected by multiple sensors in the same system at
multiple system levels may contain duplicated system reliability information, thus
they require different data analysis technique.
The basic problem for analyzing this type of data is that we cannot treat them
as independent data although they come from individual sensors. The dependen-
cies between the states of systems and components under monitoring must be taken
into consideration in data analysis. Only a few previous studies have addressed this
problem. Graves et al. (2008) proposed a method that incorporates overlapping data
for traditional binary-state series/parallel systems. Their methodology relies on dis-
joint cut-set generation and considers each observation in isolation. Jackson (2011)
extended this line of research by adding continuous failure time data. However,
their methodology can only apply to the system failure that is represented by a fault
tree. In addition, using their approach, generating all possible system failure cases
was cumbersome. In this section, we consider the data scenario with simultaneous,
multi-level sensor data from the same system and incorporate it into the BN model
analysis. A Bayesian inference method is developed for dealing with simultaneous
higher-level data and partial lower-level data.
Suppose that a system-level sensor monitors the system’s health status. Some
(not all) of its components/subsystems are also monitored by their own sensors.
Each sensor will store the information such as how many failures occurred in a time
interval (e.g., a day). These failures at different levels are correlated, as they come
from the same system. For instance, considering a two-component series system, if
the system is known to be functioning, this implies that both components must be
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functioning too. But, if both components are not monitored and the system is not
functioning, it is impossible to know which component has failed or both of them
failed. Only if we have one component monitored, the other component’s state can
be inferred by the observations at both system and component levels. In general,
tracking and consolidating the states of monitored system and components can be
done when a deterministic system reliability configuration is known. However, this
process can be very tedious and varies according to system configuration. Using BN
models, we are able to provide a generic algorithm of sensor data consolidation and
code it into a computer program.
To develop the likelihood function of a BNmodel with simultaneous, multi-level
sensor data, all possible instances of component and system states that imply the
observed evidence by sensors need to be captured. To formulate the probability
function for each of these combinations, we start by constructing state vector of all
nodes in a Bayesian network. The state variable of the ith node is denoted by xi, (0
for functional and 1 for dysfunctional). The states of all nodes are given by the state
vector, x = fx1; x2; : : : ; xn; x0g, when the BN model has n component nodes and
one system node (x0).
Assume that all nodes are binary-state nodes, then there are 2(n+1) possible com-
binations and hence 2(n+1) possible state vectors. For example, for a 2-component
system, there are 2(2+1) = 8 possible state vectors. They can be represented such
that: x1 = f0; 0; 0g; x2 = f0; 0; 1g; x3 = f0; 1; 0g; x4 = f0; 1; 1g; x5 = f1; 0; 0g; x6 =
f1; 0; 1g; x7 = f1; 1; 0g, and x8 = f1; 1; 1g. The probability of each state vector’s oc-
currence is defined by the joint distribution of the BN (see Eq. 2.1). As an example,
for the 2-component system in Figure 1, we can define the joint probability of each
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combination such as
Pr(x1) = Pr(x1 = 0)Pr(x2 = 0)Pr(x0 = 0 j x1 = 0; x2 = 0)
Pr(x2) = Pr(x1 = 0)Pr(x2 = 0)Pr(x0 = 1 j x1 = 0; x2 = 0)
Pr(x3) = Pr(x1 = 0)Pr(x2 = 1)Pr(x0 = 0 j x1 = 0; x2 = 1)
Pr(x4) = Pr(x1 = 0)Pr(x2 = 1)Pr(x0 = 1 j x1 = 0; x2 = 1)
Pr(x5) = Pr(x1 = 1)Pr(x2 = 0)Pr(x0 = 0 j x1 = 1; x2 = 0)
Pr(x6) = Pr(x1 = 1)Pr(x2 = 0)Pr(x0 = 1 j x1 = 1; x2 = 0)
Pr(x7) = Pr(x1 = 1)Pr(x2 = 1)Pr(x0 = 0 j x1 = 1; x2 = 1)
Pr(x8) = Pr(x1 = 1)Pr(x2 = 1)Pr(x0 = 1 j x1 = 1; x2 = 1) (3.15)
with the constraint that
P8
i=1 Pr(xi) = 1.
After formulating these state vector probabilities, we need to count how many
times each state vector is observed in a specific evidence set. Thus, we represent
the occurrence of each state vector by a count vector, y = fy1; y2; : : : ; yj; : : : ; y2n+1g,
where yj is the number of occurrences of the jth state vector, xj.
Consider the 2-component system example in Figure 5. We need to keep track
of the counts for each of the 8 state vectors. If we observe the state vector x8 =
f1; 1; 1g 2 times in an evidence set, then y8 = 2. If we also observe x4 = f0; 1; 1g
once, then y4 = 1. Combining them together, the count vector is given by y =
f0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 2g.
The likelihood function of specific evidence set is derived from a multinomial
distribution. As a sensor signal only depends on the state of the node under its
monitoring, each observation set from the system leads to exactly one state vector,
then the count vector clearly follows a multinomial distribution with its parameters
being the state vector probabilities defined in Eq. 3.15. That is, the random variables
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yj indicate the number of occurrence state vector xj observed overN instances (total
number of sensor signals).
Therefore, the likelihood function of one specific evidence set is given by
Pr(y j p) = N !
y1!y2! : : : y2n+1 !
(Pr(x1))y1 (Pr(x2))y2 : : : (Pr(x2n+1))
y2n+1
=N !
2n+1Y
j=1
 
Pr(xj)
yj
yj!
=N !
2n+1Y
j=1
f 1
yj!
[
 
nY
i=1
(pi)
(xi)j(1  pi)[1 (xi)j ]
!
(p(x1)j :::(xn)j)
(x0)j(1  p(x1)j :::(xn)j)[1 (x0)j ]]g (3.16)
When there are only a partial set of components are monitored, it is im-
portant to realize that there could be more than one count vector that satisfy
the evidence set from sensors. Thus, we need to keep track of the count vec-
tor for each possible scenario. Let the kth possible count vector to be yk =
f(y1)k; (y2)k; : : : ; (yl)k; : : : ; (y2n+1)kg, where (yj)k is the number of occurrences of the
jth state vector, xj, in the kth scenario that satisfies the given evidence. Then, the
likelihood of observing the evidence, E, should be the sum of the probability of all
possible count vectors that these evidences imply. That is,
Pr(E j p) =
X
8yk
Pr(yk j p)
=N !
X
8yk
[
2n+1Y
j=1
f 1
yj!
[
 
nY
i=1
(pi)
(xi)j(1  pi)[1 (xi)j ]
!
(p(x1)j :::(xn)j)
(x0)j(1  p(x1)j :::(xn)j)[1 (x0)j ]]g] (3.17)
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Therefore,
L(E j p) /
X
8yk
[
2n+1Y
j=1
f 1
yj!
[
 
nY
i=1
(pi)
(xi)j(1  pi)[1 (xi)j ]
!
(p(x1)j :::(xn)j)
(x0)j(1  p(x1)j :::(xn)j)[1 (x0)j ]]g] (3.18)
To illustrate the computation, we use the BNmodel in Figure 5 as an example. In
this 2-component system we assume there is one sensor placed on the component
1 node and another sensor on the system node (see Figure 7). Over the observation
period, a series of 5 failure events were detected at the system level by sensor 1 and
one failure event was detected at the component level by sensor 2. However, no
direct information of component 2 is available, as it is not monitored by sensor.
Figure 7. Basic two component BN system with sensors on the system and
component 1.
Since there are two components (i.e. n = 2), the number of possible state vec-
tors is 2n+1 = 23 = 8. The state vectors are listed in Table 10, along with their
probabilities.
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Table 10. State Vectors of system in Figure 7.
State Vector # j Node states State vector xj Probability Pr(xj j p)(x1)j (x2)j (x0)j
1 0 0 0 f0; 0; 0g (1  p1)(1  p2)(1  p00)
2 0 0 1 f0; 0; 1g (1  p1)(1  p2)p00
3 0 1 0 f0; 1; 0g (1  p1)p2(1  p01)
4 0 1 1 f0; 1; 1g (1  p1)p2p01
5 1 0 0 f1; 0; 0g p1(1  p2)(1  p10)
6 1 0 1 f1; 0; 1g p1(1  p2)p10
7 1 1 0 f1; 1; 0g p1p2(1  p11)
8 1 1 1 f1; 1; 1g p1p2p11
The five observed system failure events are certainly related to the events at the
component level. For each system event, it invokes one or more of the 8 possible
state vectors. In this example, as we observe 5 failures at the system and 1 failure at
component 1, the state vectors must be four f0; x2; 1g and one f1; x2; 1g. As there
are two possible states for the unobservable node x2, the four events of f0; x2; 1g are
distributed among two possible state vectors and there are 5 distinct arrangements.
Similarly, there are 2 arrangements for the single event of f1; x2; 1g. Thus, the total
number of possible count vectors is 5 2 = 10.
For example, among the 5 observed system events, one possible scenario is that
x2 = f0; 0; 1g occurred 4 times and x6 = f1; 0; 1g occurred 1 time. Correspondingly,
we have y2 = 4 and y6 = 1, and other yj ’s are zeros. This is the first row in Table 11.
Another possible scenario is that x4 = f0; 1; 1g occurred 4 times and x8 = f1; 1; 1g
occurred 1 time. This is the last row in Table 11. After enumerating all possible
scenarios, their corresponding count vectors are listed in Table 11.
We used the likelihood function given by Eq. 3.18 along with uniform prior
distributions of p to generate the posterior distributions of the parameters of BN
model. MCMC was performed to draw samples from the unnormalized joint pos-
terior distribution. We used the Bayesian software package, WinBUGS, to carry out
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the computation. One advantage of using WinBUGS software is that it can be also
called from the statistical software R (R CORE TEAM et al., 2012) through a package
called R2WinBUGS, making it more convenient for the analysis of simulation results.
Table 11. Possible state vector combinations of system in Figure 7.
Count Vector # k
Count vector, yk
(no. of jth state vectors)
(y1)k (y2)k (y3)k (y4)k (y5)k (y6)k (y7)k (y8)k
1 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0
4 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1
5 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0
6 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1
7 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 0
8 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0
10 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
The following results are based on discarding the first 20; 000 draws from the
MCMC sampling chain and then keeping every other sample (to reduce the auto-
correlation of drawn samples) until there were 100; 000 draws from the joint posterior
distribution.
Based on the results in Table 12, we can conclude that the system behaves like
a series system, because the system has high probability of failure when at least one
of the components has failed. It is also found that there is a notable probability of
system failure even when both components are functioning, so there might be some
unknown factors that affect the working mechanism of the system. As a result, we
are able to assess the dependencies between the system’s health and the states of its
components even when only a partial set of components are monitored.
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Table 12. Empirical mean, standard deviation, and quantiles for parameters.
Mean SD 2:5% 25% 50% 75% 97:5%
p1 0:148967691 0:062107504 0:02870975 0:1008 0:1535 0:2015 0:2452
p2 0:169756133 0:062686748 0:02449975 0:1295 0:1849 0:2217 0:2475
p00 0:183846816 0:055111599 0:0452995 0:1531 0:1987 0:2279 0:2481
p01 0:799470654 0:138742057 0:524 0:6922 0:8218 0:9197 0:9926
p10 0:772466599 0:142763382 0:5171 0:6534 0:7832 0:8973 0:9899
p11 0:876228065 0:072134488 0:7562 0:8143 0:8767 0:9389 0:9938
3.4 Case Study
In this section, we demonstrate our methodology on a hypothetical mechatronic
system: an active vehicle suspension (AVS), previously presented in Zhong et al.
(2010). In the previous study, the system reliability configuration was deterministic,
represented by a fault tree. In our study, we remodel one of its subsystems by a
BN, assuming that this subsystem is redesigned and its reliability structure is more
complex than the old generation. We start by introducing the AVS system.
The AVS system supports the vehicle body and reduces body vibration from the
road surface. The system consists of tires, springs, dampers (shock absorbers) and
linkages that connect a vehicle to its wheels and allows relative motion between the
two. Suspension systems contribute to the vehicle’s road handling and braking for
good active safety, and keep vehicle occupants isolated from road noise and bumps.
The suspension also protects the vehicle from damage and wear. Fully active sus-
pension systems use electronic monitoring of vehicle conditions, in order to impact
vehicle suspension and behavior in real time to directly control the motion of the
car.
Figure 8 shows the fault tree of a simplified version of the system. The system
has a parallel structure. The parallel system is composed of two subsystems: a pas-
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sive subsystem and an actuator subsystem. The passive subsystem works in a series
structure with the spring and damper (shock absorber) components, where the shock
absorbers damp out the motions of a vehicle up and down on its springs. The actu-
ator subsystem also works in a series structure with mechanical and electronic parts.
Active suspensions use actuators to raise and lower the chassis independently at each
wheel. The mechanical parts include components like pump, piston, and servovalve;
whereas the electronic parts include power, sensors, and the controller. The suspen-
sion reacts to signals from the electronic controller (which means the suspension is
externally controlled). Sensors continually monitor body movement and vehicle ride
level, constantly supplying the computer with new data.
Figure 8. The fault tree of an active vehicle suspension.
Next, we model the AVS system as a Bayesian network (see Figure 9). Suppose
that the parallel structure of the system reliability and the series structure of the ac-
tuator reliability are unchanged, but, due to a redesign, the reliability structure of
the passive device reliability becomes uncertain. Therefore, we are interested in ex-
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ploring the relationship between node X2 and its parent nodes, X4 and X5, through
conditional probabilities.
Figure 9. The corresponding BN model of the fault tree model in Figure 8.
In this scenario we continually monitor the system with sensors on nodes X1, X4
and X7. We observe a series of 10 events where 10 failures were detected at the
system level (by sensor 1), 2 failures were detected by sensor 2 and no failures were
detected by sensor 3 (see Figure 10).
Since there are 7 components in the system, the number of possible state vectors
would be 27 = 128 if we did not observe any evidence. As some parts of system
reliability structure are deterministic, we can eliminate a great amount of state vectors
according to the evidence coming from the sensor.
The first step is to construct the state vectors as explained in Section 3.3.2.3. The
states of X6 and X7 uniquely define the state of X3, and the states of X2 and X3
uniquely define the state of X1. Therefore, we only need to consider the stochastic
nodes, X2; X4; X5; X6; X7, in the model inference. Thus, we have 25 = 32 state
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vectors. The joint probability is represented as
P (X) = P (X4)P (X5)P (X6)P (X7)P (X2 j X4; X5) (3.19)
Figure 10. The AVS model with sensors.
Therefore, the parameters that we would like to estimate in this system are the
failure probabilities p = fp4; p5; p6; p7; p11; p10; p01; p00g where pij = P (X2 = 1 j X4 =
i;X5 = j). Note that p3 = (1  (1  p6)(1  p7) (series system) and p1 = p2p3 (parallel
system). The state vectors are listed in Table 13, along with their probabilities.
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Table 13. State Vectors of system in Figure 10.
Vector x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 Probability
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1  p4)(1  p5)(1  p6)(1  p7)(1  p00)
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 (1  p4)p5(1  p6)(1  p7)(1  p01)
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 p4(1  p5)(1  p6)(1  p7)(1  p10)
4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 p4p5(1  p6)(1  p7)(1  p11)
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1  p4)(1  p5)(1  p6)p7(1  p00)
6 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 (1  p4)(1  p5)p6(1  p7)(1  p00)
7 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 (1  p4)(1  p5)p6p7(1  p00)
8 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 (1  p4)p5(1  p6)p7(1  p01)
9 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 (1  p4)p5p6(1  p7)(1  p01)
10 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 (1  p4)p5p6p7(1  p01)
11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 p4(1  p5)(1  p6)p7(1  p10)
12 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 p4(1  p5)p6(1  p7)(1  p10)
13 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 p4(1  p5)p6p7(1  p10)
14 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 p4p5(1  p6)p7(1  p11)
15 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 p4p5p6(1  p7)(1  p11)
16 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 p4p5p6p7(1  p11)
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1  p4)(1  p5)(1  p6)(1  p7)p00
18 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 (1  p4)p5(1  p6)(1  p7)p00
19 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 p4(1  p5)(1  p6)(1  p7)p10
20 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 p4p5(1  p6)(1  p7)p11
21 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 (1  p4)(1  p5)(1  p6)p7p00
22 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 (1  p4)(1  p5)p6(1  p7)p00
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – Continued from previous page
Vector x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 Probability
23 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 (1  p4)(1  p5)p6p7p00
24 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 (1  p4)p5(1  p6)p7p01
25 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 (1  p4)p5p6(1  p7)p01
26 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 (1  p4)p5p6p7p01
27 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 p4(1  p5)(1  p6)p7p10
28 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 p4(1  p5)p6(1  p7)p10
29 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 p4(1  p5)p6p7p10
30 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 p4p5(1  p6)p7p11
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 p4p5p6(1  p7)p11
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 p4p5p6p7p11
For the 10 observed events (i.e. N = 10), there are many possible state vector
combinations, as each event will invoke one of the 32 possible state vectors. We
elicited these vectors by a MATLAB program (Hunt et al., 2014) and counted the
occurrence of each state vector for the given evidence. In this example, we obtained
27 possible counts vectors, yk, that imply the evidence; that is, there are 27 possible
arrangements of state vectors that match the evidence coming from the sensors.
The likelihood function is constructed by summing up individual likelihoods de-
fined by the multinomial distribution for each count vector, yk, as was formulated in
Eq. 3.18. The posterior distributions for these failure probabilities are obtained by
using uniform priors in WinBUGS.
The evidence set claims that, out of 10 system failures, sensor 2 only detected 2
failures, and sensor 3 did not detect any failures; therefore the probability of failure
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for node 4 and node 7 (p4 and p7) should be very small. This is confirmed by the
MCMC output. Since we do not have any information about node 5, p5 is around
0.5. The posterior failure probability of node 6 is very large because it is needed
to compensate the low failure probability of node 7, for the series structure of their
subsystem. More importantly, with the evidence set we are able to infer the reliability
structure of the passive device subsystem (including nodes 2, 4 and 5). The condi-
tional probabilities listed in Table 14 show that this subsystem has a high probability
of failure when at least one of its components has failed. So, we can conclude that
the reliability structure of the passive device subsystem is close to a series system.
Table 14. Empirical mean, standard deviation, and quantiles for parameters.
Mean SD 2:5% 25% 50% 75% 97:5%
p4 0:184684 0:067958 0:05203 0:1333 0:1883 0:2409 0:2936
p5 0:517456 0:076611 0:3156 0:4831 0:5398 0:5747 0:5978
p6 0:917133 0:07627 0:7163 0:8821 0:9393 0:9745 0:9977
p7 0:083205 0:07647 0:002211 0:0256 0:06082 0:118 0:2859
p00 0:16214 0:06627 0:01738 0:1156 0:1773 0:2183 0:2471
p01 0:885807 0:099819 0:6257 0:8343 0:914 0:9638 0:9968
p10 0:774643 0:143001 0:517 0:656175 0:787 0:8993 0:9908
p11 0:881724 0:072124 0:7572 0:8203 0:8849 0:9448 0:9945
The plots of prior and posterior distributions of these conditional probabilities
are shown in Figure 11. From these plots we can see that, after combining evidence
from sensors, the uniform prior evolves to a more narrowly distributed posterior. As
a result, our method proves to be an effective way to assess dependencies in system
reliability, even in the case of only a partial set of components being monitored.
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Figure 11. Prior (dashed lines) and posterior (solid lines) distributions of
conditional probabilities.
3.4.1 Computational Complexity
As one can see from this case study, the computation complexity of our algorithm
is not trivial. The evaluation of the likelihood function presented in this paper relies
on identifying combinations of state vectors that are implied by the evidence. The
speed of evaluation is largely dependent on the generation of possible state vectors
for the system and then identifying all combinations of those state vectors. Once
the state vector combinations are developed, the likelihood function can easily be
calculated.
The generation of the set of combinations of state vectors is the most compu-
tationally intensive part for developing the likelihood function. We have developed
an algorithm to rapidly identify these combinations. The first part of the algorithm,
compiled in MATLAB, constructs all combinations of the count vectors for a given
number of tests. The complexity of this part of the algorithm is O(mn), where m is
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the number of tests and n is the number of state vector combinations. Therefore,
the number of count vectors increases exponentially with number of state vectors.
As a result, the complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the number of tests, but
exponential in the number of state vector combinations. We admit that this might
be problematic for very complex systems with hundreds of components.
We, however, suggest an alternative solution for combining state vectors. The
matrix of count vectors is actually very sparse due to the fact that we do not observe
all of the combinations. Therefore, it is not necessary to calculate all combinations.
Note that the number of combinations of state vectors is related to number of ways
distributing n identical objects among r groups and this can be done in C(n + r  
1; r   1) ways, where n is the number of counts of a specific vector combination
observed and r is the number of possible combinations for unknown nodes. We
have devised a formula that will rapidly give us the number of count vectors that
satisfy the evidence and hence will provide rapid analysis of the likelihood function
for subsequent Bayesian analysis.
For example, in the case study, according to the given evidence, we can specify
what vectors are possible to be observed, so we do not need to combine all of the
state vector combinations in our algorithm. Following the evidence, we infer that the
state vectors must be eight f1; 1; 1; 0; x5; 1; 0g’s (n1 = 8) and two f1; 1; 1; 1; x5; 1; 0g’s
(n2 = 2). As there are two possible states for the unobservable node x5, r1 = r2 =
2. Therefore, total number of count vectors satisfying the evidence can be directly
calculated as C(9; 1)  C(3; 1) = 27. As a result, we can generate count vectors
without going through all the possible combinations of state vectors.
Since probabilistic inference using BN is NP-hard (Cooper, 1990), we suggest
designing efficient special-case algorithms, rather than using general probabilistic in-
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ference algorithms, for a specific problem. Stochastic simulation algorithms such as
MCMC are very efficient, and they can be tuned to improve run times, especially in
the incomplete data case.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this chapter we generalize the system reliability configuration of a complex sys-
tem to a Bayesian network model. We are interested in exploring the relationship of
system/subsystem reliability to its components. This research is particularly mean-
ingful to a new system design where the system reliability configuration is uncertain.
Using the Bayesian inference approach, we are able to combine information from
multiple sources and multiple levels of the system to infer the conditional probabili-
ties in BN.
Three data scenarios are discussed in this chapter. In a naïve scenario where the
complete historical dataset of the states of the system and its components are avail-
able, we develop the conjugate Bayesian method for estimating the parameters in a
binary state BN, and then extend it to a multi-state BN.When only failure records are
available, we propose a method for quantifying the marginal distribution of system
failure. Finally, we discuss the scenario of incomplete lower-level system informa-
tion.
Data drawn simultaneously from the same system are fundamentally different
from independent datasets. The dependencies between higher-level failure data and
lower-level failure data are characterized by the conditional probabilities in a BN
model. In the case of having incomplete lower-level data, the likelihood function of
evidence becomes a summation of several likelihoods that correspond to all possible
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state vectors of the system. For such complicated function, it is impossible to find
a closed form solution of posterior probability; therefore, we employed the compu-
tational Bayesian method, MCMC. The resulting method is successful at quantifying
system reliability structure with incomplete data.
In this chapter, we studied simultaneous data analysis of binary-state systems.
This research will be extended to Bayesian networks modeled by continuous life
metric systems in the next chapter. Our proposed Bayesian network model can also
be coupled with Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) inference to enable model parameter
estimation without explicitly specifying its prior distribution. One concern is that, as
the number of components and possible states increase, the exponentially increasing
number of possible combinations of state vectors that comply with the observed
evidence set will significantly worsen computational efficiency. In this research, we
developed aMATLAB program to perform a rapid compilation of the set of combi-
nations of state vectors to be used in theMCMC simulation inWinBUGS. However,
a future research direction could be to develop more efficient algorithms that can
handle multi-state systems and/or continuous state systems.
Furthermore, in the Bayesian inference of multi-level system, one may encounter
the problem of the prior distribution of system reliability can be derived from two
different channels. One is from the direct estimation on the system, such as expert
opinions on the system reliability, and the other one is derived from component
priors, because system reliability is a function of component reliability. Consequently,
we need to combine the prior information from different channels. Guo (2011) used
the Bayesian melding method originally proposed by Poole and Raftery (2000). In
Chapter 4, we plan to incorporate Bayesian melding and other prior specification
methods of system reliability into BN models.
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Assessing the posterior distribution of conditional probabilities is critical to the
understanding of both the functional and physical structure of a system. More re-
search is needed on the techniques and tools for carrying out this activity. In our
current study, we usedWinBUGS, a tool for applyingMCMC simulation in Bayesian
inference. However, to reduce computational burden, other computational Bayesian
methods should be investigated in future research.
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Chapter 4
A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO SYSTEM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
WITH INCOMPLETE HETEROGENEOUS DATA
4.1 Introduction
Estimating the reliability of complex systems has been a challenging problem
as systems has grown more and more complex. Reliability engineers often have to
deal with uncertain information in a complex environment, causing them to make
decisions based on limited knowledge about the failure mechanisms of the system.
Therefore, the statistical models used for representing complex systems should be
mathematically robust, and at the same time easy to understand for reliability analysts.
These models should be able to account for different sources of information, e.g.,
reliability tests, historical data, or expert judgments. These requirements have caused
to a shift from traditional system reliability models, like fault trees and reliability
block diagrams, to more flexible modeling frameworks, like Bayesian network (BN)
(Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Bobbio et al., 2001).
In a complex system, even if many sensors have been deployed on various sys-
tem levels for monitoring the health of the system and its components, it would be
unrealistic to assume that the states of all components can be continuously observed.
It is more common to have sensory data from some components/subsystems, but
not all. In such case, a proper integration of multiple sources of information from
different components or subsystems, as well as from expert opinions, for inferring
the state of the system or some unobserved components becomes a crucial aspect
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for reliability assessment. This situation calls for a method to develop a reliability
inference method that can combine simultaneous online information from various
system levels for system and component reliability prediction.
BNs generalize fault trees by representing the relationship between components
and subsystems by conditional probabilities instead of deterministic “AND” and
“OR” gates, providing advantages when we are not sure about the reliability structure
of a complex system, especially when there is uncertainty. In addition, BNs can
accommodate different types of information, such as discrete, continuous or hybrid
datasets. These uncertainties can be easily assessed using a BN, which would be
rather difficult with conventional techniques, such as fault trees and reliability block
diagrams since they are deterministic systems. However, parameter uncertainty of
failure distributions of components has not received enough attention in the BN
literature. This uncertainty of these parameters especially become apparent when
there are some unobserved components in a complex system, and it is a challenging
problem.
A great majority of this line of work considers the case of discrete Bayesian
networks, i.e., networks that contain only discrete variables. Incorporation of dis-
crete sources of data, such as pass/fail tests, from various levels in the system using
Bayesian inference has been studied extensively (seeGraves et al. (2007); Hamada et al.
(2004); Johnson et al. (2003); Martz et al. (1988); Reese et al. (2005a). However, incor-
porating continuous data is more challenging, especially in the context of Bayesian
inference, due to the integrals involved in calculations. Discrete networks are some-
times inadequate, since many important domains have continuous attributes as well
as discrete ones. One can always discretize the continuous variables by partitioning
their domain into some finite number of subsets, and transform the model to a dis-
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crete BN. However, this simple approach is often very problematic and might lead to
poor performance. In our approach, we treat the continuous variables as continuous
without trying to discretize them.
When a system is continuously monitored, the time at which the system or any of
its components transitions from one state to another is a continuous random variable,
thus the probability (or reliability) that they exist in a particular state is a function of
time. Binary-state systems are those whose variables exist in either “failed” or “suc-
cessful” states. The scope of this work is limited to binary-state systems. As failure
times are observed, the likelihood function is a function of failure times. However,
these observed failure data from different components and subsystems can be over-
lapping because in a coherent system they may represent the same event at different
system levels. The probability of a component having failed at a given time is defined
by the failure distribution parameters of that component.
This chapter presents a Bayesian network methodology for incorporating over-
lapping higher level data when making inferences about component reliability pa-
rameters associated with a time based reliability function. We develop a Bayesian
model that accommodates lifetime information coming from some of the variables
of a BN simultaneously. We show that our Bayesian network model can incorporate
any parametric lifetime distribution for modeling the time-to-failure of the system
components and can handle continuous variables without applying discretization.
An outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section presents a literature re-
view of Bayesian network models with continuous and hybrid data structures. Our
framework for system reliability and the inference method are discussed in Section
4.3. We start by discussing how to formulate the likelihood function with incom-
plete lifetime data, and then extend the case to the hybrid datasets where we also
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incorporate discrete pass/fail data into the likelihood formulation. We illustrate the
proposed approach with an application to a missile guidance system in Section 4.4.
Finally, we conclude the chapter with a discussion in Section 4.5.
4.2 Background
Bayesian networks have been used extensively in system reliability analysis due to
their abilities in handling variables which are represented by a multivariate probability
distribution (Bobbio et al., 2001; Doguc and Ramirez-Marquez, 2009; Mahadevan
et al., 2001). Most of the research on Bayesian networks has focused on systems with
discrete variables, or continuous variables with Gaussian distributions. Handling
continuous variables have been a problematic issue for Bayesian networks due to
the integrals involved in the likelihood calculations.
There are different types of Bayesian networks with respect to the type of their
variables. These different types of BNs all require different analysis techniques be-
cause they all have different structures. In discrete state BNs, the state indicates
whether the component works or fails, and it can be deducted from fault trees or
reliability block diagrams. In this case, the variables of the BN are defined in dis-
crete space and the BN is characterized by the conditional probability tables. Most
of the research in the literature has focused on the discrete state BNs (Mahadevan
et al., 2001; Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007). Exact inference in discrete state BNs is
possible with some algorithms, such as variable elimination, belief propagation and
junction trees (Heckerman, 1998; Koller and Friedman, 2009).
Continuous state BNs, on the other hand, assign a probabilistic distribution to the
time-to-failure data of a component (Langseth and Portinale, 2007). The difference is
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that, in a continuous BN, the variables have a continuous state space. The state space
represents the instant of time that the system component failed and covers the set of
nonnegative real numbers. In literature, Hulting and Robinson (1994) extended the
Martz et al. (1988) and Martz and Wailer (1990) methods to lifetime data. Like the
binomial data method, Hulting and Robinson (1994) employed approximations in
building up from component-reliability assessment to a system-reliability assessment.
Boudali and Dugan (2005) presented a non-parametric discrete-time time-to-failure
model, and Boudali and Dugan (2006) modeled a continuous-time time-to-failure in
close-form without considering model uncertainty. Their continuous BN framework
was able to capture the system components’ behaviors and interactions, proposing a
temporal Bayesian network reliability modeling and analysis method. However, it is
still a challenging task to model the time-to-failure distribution because of the com-
plexity of modeling a probability density in continuous space. Johnson et al. (2003)
modeled the distribution parameters of time-to-failure as a continuous unknown vari-
able, such as the scale and the shape of a 2-parameter Weibull density. This facilitates
passing information through the network and the reliability analysis at system level
based on the characteristics of the lifetime distributions of components. However,
the integral in continuous state space makes the calculations intractable when the
systems grow more complex.
Some researchers have proposed non-parametric methods for continuous
Bayesian networks. Zhong et al. (2010) formulated the problem of system relia-
bility assessment as a BN considering the parameter uncertainty. They modeled the
time-to-failure of the system/components by the parametric distributions whose
parameters are considered as random variables in the BN. For reasoning in a continu-
ous BN, their method provided an alternative solution to the other methods, such as
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mixture of truncated exponentials, dynamic discretization and Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC). Warr and Collins (2014) also presented a hierarchical nonparametric
framework, using Dirichlet processes, in which time-to-event distributions may be
estimated from sample data or derived based on physical failure mechanisms. Their
goal was to develop reliability estimates for complex systems, including estimates
of uncertainty, using component, subsystem, and system data, and all available data
types, which may include subjective data such as expert opinion as well as data
collected from various formal tests.
Finally, hybrid-state BNs contain mixtures of discrete and continuous variables.
Continuous and hybrid state BNs show similar characteristics and hybrid state BNs
are also imposed to the same difficulties when it comes to computing posterior dis-
tributions. Previous research has suggested some discretization methods to perform
the inference in the continuous/hybrid Bayesian networks (Langseth et al., 2009; Neil
et al., 2007, 2008). Neil et al. (2008) have modeled time-to-failure distributions by
continuous random variables as well as by discrete random variables. Marquez et al.
(2010) showed how BN algorithms can be used to model time to failure distributions
and performed reliability analysis of complex systems. Their hybrid BN approach
extended fault trees by defining the time-to-failure of the fault tree constructs as de-
terministic functions of the corresponding input components’ time-to-failure. Their
approach incorporated an approximate inference algorithm for hybrid BNs, based
on a process of dynamic discretization of the domain of all continuous variables
in the BN. Iamsumang et al. (2015) also presented a hybrid BN-based methodology
for component degradation modeling and efficient algorithm development with an
application to online health monitoring of complex systems. They introduced a hy-
brid dynamic Bayesian network with component-based structure to represent com-
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plex engineering systems with underlying physics of failure by modeling an empirical
degradation model with continuous variables. However, all these methods have not
paid enough attention to the stochastic nature of parametric time-to-failure models
in system reliability. They also have not considered simultaneous and incomplete
data in their analyses.
Unfortunately, exact inference in continuous BNs with general distributions does
not exist, especially when the data is incomplete, although the inference for the case
where the distributions are Gaussians can be found in literature. Moral et al. (2001)
described a theory for exact inference where distributions are specified as a mixture
of truncated exponentials. However, at this point, in order to get the closed-form
solution, one needs to go through multiple integrations. This process is very time
consuming. Moreover, a closed-form solution can only be obtained if the integral is
analytically solvable. An approximate solution has to be performed in the case where
the closed-form solution cannot be explicitly derived.
All the aforementioned studies for continuous/hybrid BNs had good contribu-
tions. However, in highly complex systems, algorithms require large amount of com-
putational time for inference in a continuous/hybrid BN. The computation time
grows exponentially with each additional layer of network and becomes infeasible
with a large number of nodes. As a result, for continuous BNs and hybrid BNs
containing both discrete and continuous variables with non-Gaussian distributions,
exact inference becomes computationally intractable (Boyen and Koller, 1998).
Markov chains have also been used for modeling continuous Bayesian networks
in the literature (Boudali and Dugan, 2006). However, they present some limita-
tions. Specifying a Markov chain for a large system becomes a cumbersome and
tedious task. Markov chain modeling is limited to Markov processes, which gener-
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ally requires all failure times to be exponentially distributed. Markov chains are also
faced with the state space explosion problem; in fact, the number of states grows
exponentially with the size of the system. Consequently, the number of differential
equations to be solved grows exponentially with the size of the system. The state
space explosion is one of the main limitations in using Markov chains for modeling
large systems.
As a result, due to the limitations of Markov chains, discretization of the vari-
ables and assumption of Gaussian distributions, Bayesian researchers have focused
on developing more efficient methods for incorporating continuous variables in their
frameworks. For example, Wilson et al. (2006) showed how to combine reliability
data that change over time, with an example that had binomial data at the system
and one component, lifetime data at a second component, and degradation data at
a third component. However, this paper did not demonstrate how to incorporate
lifetime data at the system level. Guo (2011) proposed a model that considers life-
time data at every component. Their solution was to simply re-express system and
subsystem lifetime distributions in terms of component lifetime distributions using
deterministic relations derived from the system structure. However, their model was
based on reliability block diagrams and they used independent and complete data
in their analysis. Reese et al. (2011) presented a Bayesian model for assessing the
reliability of multicomponent systems. In their model, lifetime data collected at the
component, subsystem, or system level were integrated with prior information at
any level. However, they also assumed that the test data are completely observed
and independent from each other.
In literature, there have been very few studies developed for overlapping data at
various levels of a system. Jackson (2011) developed an overlapping data likelihood
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function to incorporate inherent dependencies between the datasets and generate the
correct inference within Bayes’ theorem for systems. Their overlapping data Bayesian
method incorporates all information and evidence that can possibly be generated or
observed by complex time based systems represented by a fault tree. In this research,
we focus on the problem of inference of the reliability model parameters in a BN in
system reliability context using simultaneous and incomplete hybrid data.
4.3 Methodology
In this section Bayesian inference methods are discussed for simultaneously esti-
mating parameters of lifetime distributions in a Bayesian network when lifetime and
pass/fail data are collected from different levels of the system. We develop the likeli-
hood function for simultaneous continuous and discrete data in a time based system
represented by a Bayesian network structure, thus presenting a generalization to the
standard series and parallel systems. We assume the structure of the network is given
and the conditional probabilities of the network are known.
4.3.1 Bayesian Networks in Reliability Assessment
In recent years, Bayesian networks (BNs) have been increasingly used in a wide
range of applications including computer science, bioinformatics, data fusion, de-
cision support systems and others. A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) that represents a joint probability distribution among a set of variables, where
the nodes denote random variables and the arcs between these variables denote
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the conditional dependencies (represented by conditional probability distributions)
among variables (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
A Bayesian network model allows for efficient calculation of belief revisions, i.e.
calculating the quantitative belief changes of variables when new evidence is ob-
served. This is very useful for diagnostic and prediction purposes in decision support
environments, such as reliability assessment domains. An example of a BN can be
seen in Figure 12.
Figure 12. A sample Bayesian network
In a BN, the nodes without any arrows directed into them are called root nodes
(also called parent nodes) and they are described according to their marginal prob-
ability distributions (nodes X1 and X2 in Figure 12). The nodes that have arrows
directed into them are called child nodes. Each child has a conditional probability
distribution associated with it, given the values of parent nodes.
Nodes in a Bayesian network are said to be uncorrelated if there is no arc between
these nodes. This situation is called conditional independence. The conditional in-
dependence structure reduces significantly the complexity of inference and allow to
decompose the underlying joint probability distribution as a product of local con-
ditional probability distributions (CPDs) associated to each node and its respective
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parents (Spiegelhalter and Lauritzen, 1990). If the variables are discrete, the CPDs
can be represented by conditional probability tables (CPTs), which list the probabil-
ity that the child node takes on each of its different values for each combination of
values of its parents.
Let G be the BN in Figure 12 with nodes X1; X2; X3; X4. The joint distribution
of G over the variables can be written as
P (X1; X2; X3; X4) =
4Y
i=1
P (Xi j pa(Xi)) = P (X1)P (X2)P (X3 j X1; X2)P (X4 j X3)
(4.1)
where the multiplication is replaced by an integral in case of continuous variables.
The simplest of Bayesian networks are binary-state BNs, where components are
either in the “functional” or “failed” states. “Multi-state” BNs involve components
that can be classified by order of severity in various degraded states ranging from
“functional” to “failed”. However, restricting our attention to models containing
only discrete variables seems very unsatisfactory in the domain of reliability analysis.
Bayesian networks based on continuous data are those whose failure probability is a
function of a time variable, which is our main focus in this chapter.
4.3.2 Integrating Incomplete Lifetime Data Using Bayesian Inference
Learning Bayesian networks from data has drawn lots of attention by researchers
in order to be able to apply BNs to real-world applications. Learning from complete
data has been studied extensively in the last decade. If the data is complete, or fully
observed, so that each of the network variables is observed, learning BN parameters
is not difficult, however, in many applications, data can be incomplete for various
reasons. In the complete data case, we can use binomial likelihood and beta priors
75
and obtain a closed form solution for the distribution of the parameters (Martz et al.,
1988; Johnson et al., 2003; Hamada et al., 2004). If the data is complete, the learning
problem reduces to a set of local learning problems, one for each variable (Koller
and Friedman, 2009). However, in reality one frequently has to deal with incomplete
data. The problem gets more complicated for the incomplete data case, where the
variables are partially observed, so that, in each instance, some variables (known in
advance) are not observed in the Bayesian network. Learning Bayesian networks
from incomplete data is a very difficult problem. The occurrence of missing values
leads to analytical intractability and high computational complexity compared to the
complete data scenario. The existing methods either use inference algorithms to get
the expected values of statistics or delete the missing values. Approaches like the
expectation-maximization might get stuck at local optima (Lauritzen, 1995). In our
methodology, we prefer to use Bayesian inference for parameter learning, as it is
a powerful tool when used with probabilistic graphical models such Bayesian net-
works. A commonly adopted technique for applying Bayesian inference is Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, for their efficiency in sampling from the joint
probability distribution of the model (Gelman et al., 2014). To implement MCMC,
we use WinBUGS, a statistical software for Bayesian inference (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2003). WinBUGS is a general purpose modeling language, which takes as its input
a BN model and returns samples that can be used for estimating the posterior prob-
ability distributions of the model parameters. In this paper, we develop a method
that is statistically valid, and correctly reflects the increased uncertainty due to miss-
ing data. We also demonstrate that the MCMC method can learn Bayesian networks
from incomplete data efficiently.
In order to make inferences about the failure parameters of the components, we
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need to update the prior beliefs as in Bayes’ theorem such that
1( j E) = L(E j )0()R
8 L(E j 
0
)0(
0
)d
0 (4.2)
where L(E j ) is the likelihood of observing evidence set E for given parameter set
. The challenge here is how to formulate the likelihood function due to the fact
that the collected data at different system levels are overlapping, causing dependency
among them. Therefore, the likelihood function cannot be a multiplication of sepa-
rate likelihoods coming from different nodes. A special consideration is needed for
the formulation of the total likelihood function.
In our system representation, we adopt the following convention. Given a com-
ponent, we represent the state of the component with either one of the two states:
1 for failed component, and 0 for working component. The quantification of the
Bayesian network requires the assignment of a probability value to each node. Since
the computation is performed according to a given time t, the failure probabilities of
the components at time t should be provided. For discrete systems, the failure prob-
ability is a parameter of Binomial distribution. For systems and components dealing
with continuous data, on the other hand, the probability of being in a “failed” or
“working” state is a function of time. For example, the probability of a component
being in the “failed” state is Pr(C = 1 = failed) = Pr(C = 1; t) = FC(t) and the
probability of the component being in the working state is Pr(C = 0 = working) =
Pr(C = 0; t) = 1   FC(t) = RC(t), where FC(t) and RC(t) are the cumulative distri-
bution and reliability functions of that component, respectively.
We next define our system reliability representation as follows. Our system is rep-
resented as a multi-level directed acyclic graph (DAG) which contains a hierarchical
structure. The nodes of a multi-level DAG can be partitioned into levels L1; : : : ; Lm,
such that there is no edge within a level and all the edges are between nodes in level
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Li and the nodes in the adjacent levels Li 1 and Li+1 (see Figure 13 for an illustration).
We call the nodes in the adjacent lower level Li+1 as the direct subordinates of the
nodes in level Li.
Figure 13. BN representation of a hierarchical system.
As we develop the model, we will use the following notation. The components,
subsystems, and system in the BN are referred to as nodes, such as Ci and Sj in
Figure 13. The components are denoted by Ci, and subsystems and the system are
denoted by Sj . The direct subordinates of Sj are the nodes in the next lower level,
which constitute node Sj . The set of direct subordinates of Sj is denoted as Aj . In
Figure 13, for instance, system S0 has a direct subordinates set A0 = (S1; S2). The
evidence set E contains the simultaneous lifetime information collected at several
nodes in the BN.
In our Bayesian framework, we represent data and their information by likeli-
hood contributions. We would like to assess system reliability as a function of time;
therefore, we need to formulate the probability of failure as a function of time. The
probability of a component having failed at a given time t is equal to the cumulative
distribution function (CDF), F (t). The CDF is defined by a set of parameters, which
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for the ith component is represented as i. The set of component parameters for the
system is:
 = f1; 2; : : : ; ng
Our primary goal is to assess these failure parameters in order to monitor reli-
ability of the system and its components through time. The probability of the ith
component having failed at a given time t is defined by the set of reliability parame-
ters of that component. Thus, the failure probability of component Ci at time t can
be calculated by
pCi(t j Ci) = FCi(t j Ci) (4.3)
For simplicity, we will denote the component i failure probability as pCi(t). The
failure probability is a function of time, as opposed to the discrete case, where we
model discrete data as multinomial likelihood. In order to formulate the likelihood
function, we also need to model the lifetime distribution of each component, Ci,
which we will denote fCi(t j Ci), where f() is the probability density function and
represents the probability that the ith component will fail at time t. However, for
the system node and subsystem nodes (Sj), we need to infer the probability density
function using the relationship of components to the system/subsystem represented
by the Bayesian network, which will not result in a standard distribution. Therefore,
the probability density function of the system is calculated by taking the derivative
of the distribution function, such that
fSj(t j Sj) =
d
dt
FSj(t j Sj) =
d
dt
(1 RSj(t j Sj)) =  
d
dt
RSj(t j Sj) (4.4)
where the reliability function, RSj(t j Sj), is calculated by using the relationship
between components and subsystem using the BN conditional dependence structure:
RSj(t j Sj) = 1  FSj(t j Sj) =  Sj(RSk ; RCk : 8Sk 2 Aj; 8Ck 2 Aj) (4.5)
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where  Sj() is the structure function of node Sj defined by the BN structure (con-
ditional probabilities), which describes the reliability relationship between the node
and its direct subordinates. Sk, and Ck are, respectively, the subordinate subsys-
tems, and components of node Sj within the direct subordinates set Aj . Differently
from fault trees and reliability block diagrams, the dependence relations among vari-
ables in a BN are not restricted to be deterministic. This corresponds to being able
to model uncertainty in the interaction between components, by suitably specify-
ing conditional probabilities, instead of using deterministic “AND” and “OR” gates.
Probabilistic gates may reflect an imperfect knowledge of the system behavior, also
helping us quantify the dependency structure among the components (see Bobbio
et al. (2001)). As an example, for a 2-component system, the reliability of the system
can be formulated such that
Rsys(t) = sys(R1(t); R2(t))
=p00R1(t)R2(t) + p01R1(t)(1 R2(t)) + p10(1 R1(t))R2(t)
+ p11(1 R1(t))(1 R2(t))
where the conditional failure probabilities are defined as pij = Pr(Csys = 1 j C1 =
i; C2 = j) (i; j = 0 or 1). In our work, we make the assumption that these conditional
probabilities are known in advance.
As a result, our BN framework is a generalization of the series and parallel system
structures, where the conditional probabilities are either 0 or 1. Let us for instance
consider the problem of calculating the reliability of a parallel system of three compo-
nents. The components have life-lengths T1; T2 and T3 respectively, and the system’s
life-length is thus given as Tsys = max(T1; T2; T3). However, if the system is con-
nected in series, then Tsys = min(T1; T2; T3). Since Bayesian network is a stochastic
system, we do not have a deterministic relationship for the lifetime of the system.
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The system lifetime largely depends on the conditional probabilities between the
components and the system.
We would like to emphasize the importance of using simultaneous data in our
framework due to the dependencies inherent in a Bayesian network structure. If we
would like to learn about these dependencies, we need to avoid using independent
data, which will make it impossible to quantify the relationships between compo-
nents of a complex system. Therefore, in this work, we only use simultaneous data,
which means all observations come from the same system such that they are depen-
dent to each other. In case of simultaneous and incomplete data, the likelihood of
observed data is not a simple multiplication of likelihoods of the nodes anymore, so
we cannot apply Eq. 4.2 easily. We, therefore, develop a method to formulate the
likelihood function for the BN system by using conditional independencies implied
by the network structure. In the next section, we explain the concept of d-separation
and how we use this concept in the formulation of the likelihood function.
4.3.3 D-Separation in Bayesian Networks
Probabilistic graphical models such as Bayesian networks are efficient in por-
traying conditional independencies and causal relations, and the criterion called d-
separation can be used to read them off the graph (Pearl, 2014). Since every d-
separation in the graph implies conditional independence in the distribution, using
this criterion in our framework proves very efficient in our overlapping data method-
ology.
To better understand the nature of overlapping data sets, the concept of “d-
separation in Bayesian networks” is introduced. The main idea is that each observed
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variable constitutes a subset of variables that is d-separated from the rest of the vari-
ables in the Bayesian network. In effect, d-separation helps us generate separate
likelihood functions given each evidence, and then we can generate an overall likeli-
hood function. Thus, our aim in this section is to understand when we can guarantee
that an independence holds in a distribution associated with a BN structure.
Definition 4.1 D-separation (see Pearl (2014); Koller and Friedman (2009)) A path p is said to
be d-separated by a set of nodes Z if and only if:
1. p contains a chain i! m! j or a fork i m! j such that the middle node m is in Z,
or
2. p contains an inverted fork i ! m  j such that the middle node m is not in Z and such
that no descendant of m is in Z.
As a result, when influence can flow from a node to another node thoroughZ, we
say that the trail between those two nodes is active. Due to the hierarchical structure
in the reliability representation of our BN system, we only have two types of trails:
chain trail (also called causal trail) (i ! m ! j) and inverted fork trail (also called
common effect trail) (i! m j). Looking back at Figure 13, we can see the causal
trails: C1 ! S1 ! S0, C2 ! S1 ! S0, C3 ! S2 ! S0 and C4 ! S2 ! S0. The
common effect trails are: C1 ! S1  C2, C3 ! S2  C4 and S1 ! S0  S2.
We will use the concepts of “active trails” and “d-separation” to formulate condi-
tionally independent likelihood functions. A causal trail (i! m! j) is active if and
only if m is not observed. This means that every time we observe a variable, it will
block the path of influence between the upstream and downstream nodes. A com-
mon effect trail (i! m j) is actived if m is observed. This structure is also called
a v-structure (Koller and Friedman, 2009). As a result, every observed variable ac-
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tivates the v-structure (which consists of the components attached to that variable)
and cuts off the path of influence from other variables, thus creating a region of
influence conditionally independent of the rest of the network given the observed
variable. For example, if we observe variable S1 in Figure 14, then
Figure 14. Two conditionally independent sub-systems given S1.
As seen in the figure above, evidence in variable S1 breaks the BN into two condi-
tionally independent subsystems. Nodes C1 and C2 are d-separated from the rest of
the network given evidence about S1; however, they are not d-separated from each
other, so they belong to the same sub-system. In our research, it is useful to view
probabilistic influence as a flow in the graph. One node can influence another if
there is any trail along which influence can flow. As a result, d-separation provides
us with a notion of separation between nodes in a directed graph (hence the term
d-separation, for directed separation). As a result, the set of independencies derived
from d-separation is a complete characterization of the independence properties that
are implied by the network structure.
4.3.4 Formulation of the Likelihood Function for Incomplete Lifetime Data
The likelihood function plays a central role in Bayesian learning. Our approach
addresses how to parametrically model the multilevel system structure to preserve
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the probabilistic constructs defined by the BN, and to coherently combine the si-
multaneous data sets through the derivation of their joint likelihood function. A
descriptive flowchart of the proposed Bayesian approach is given in Fig. 15.
Figure 15. Descriptive flowchart of the proposed approach.
The first framework is a substitution strategy for modeling the multilevel system
structure. It is carried out by re-expressing the reliability function and distribution
function of high level node in terms of the corresponding functions of its direct sub-
ordinates, which are contained in setAj as explained in Section 4.2 (see Eq. 4.5). The
structure function  Sj derived from the BN is used to construct the inherent func-
tional relationship. The second framework is a combining strategy for integrating
the overlapping data sets. It is implemented by formulating the likelihood function
based on d-seperation. These likelihood contributions are developed according to
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the evidence and parametric models of the nodes. The third framework is a Bayesian
inference strategy for information integration. The Bayesian model is constructed
by deriving the posterior distribution of model parameters using the joint likelihood
function and specified prior distributions. After the joint posterior distribution of
model parameters are obtained, some reliability measures such as the failure rate
and predicted reliability are generated by averaging over the posterior distribution of
related model parameters.
In our model framework, lifetime data collected at individual component and
lifetime data collected at the system/subsystem level are incorporated. The data col-
lected at the higher level provide both direct information both about the system (or
subsystem) at which it was collected, and also partial information about the com-
ponents that comprise the system (or subsystem). As depicted in Figure 15, the
multilevel system structure is modeled based on parametric models of components
Ci, i = 1; : : : ; n. As explained in Section 4.2, we use structure functions ( j) as a
substitution strategy for modeling the high level nodes (Sj). This substitution is im-
plemented by formulating the reliability function of Sj with reliability functions of
its direct subordinates, that is, the nodes in Aj . The PDF, fCi(t j Ci), and reliability
function, RCi(t j Ci), of the higher level node Sj are expressed as shown in Eq. 4.4
and 4.5, respectively.
Since calculating the PDF of a higher level node requires derivation, one needs
a standard and efficient way to calculate this derivation. Note that the reliability
function RCi(t j Ci) is only a function of nodes in the next lower level, which are
composed of at most three elements: the observed component/subsystem, the un-
observed subsystem and the unobserved component in the immediate subordinate
set Aj . Next, the PDF, fCi(t j Ci), is calculated by taking the negative derivative
85
of the reliability function as in Eq. 4.4. For simplicity, we can use the chain rule of
calculus, by splitting the derivation in 3 different parts and Eq. 4.4 becomes
fSj(t j Sj) = 
d
dt
RSj(t j Sj)
= 
X
8Oi2E8Oi2Aj
@RSj(t)
@ROi(t)
 dROi(t)
dt
 
X
8Sk2Aj8Sk 62E
@RSj(t)
@RSk(t)
 dRSk(t)
dt
 
X
8Cl2Aj8Cl 62E
@RSj(t)
@RCl(t)
 dRCl(t)
dt
(4.6)
where subscript Oi belongs to the observed variables (8Oi 2 E), Sk belongs to unob-
served subsystems in the direct subordinates set (8Sk 2 Aj; 8Sk 62 E), and Ck belongs
to unobserved components in the direct subordinates set (8Cl 2 Aj; 8Cl 62 E).
When evidence data is introduced, the d-separated portions of the Bayesian net-
work structure are assessed as previously discussed in Section 4.3. To capture the
temporal dependencies found in the Bayesian network model, we will use a different
form of a special function called the unit step function (also called the Heaviside
unit-step function). In literature, unit-step and impulse functions have been used
to represent evidence (see Boudali and Dugan (2006); Jackson (2011). When the
evidence is observed, it changes the form of the distribution function of the corre-
sponding observed variable, because we know that the failure time is equal to that
instant. Since we are working with reliability functions instead of cumulative distribu-
tion functions in this work, we take a different approach and represent the reliability
function using the unit-step function. CDF of the time to failure of that compo-
nent becomes the unit step function, such that H(t) = 1 when t  0 and H(t) = 0
otherwise. Since R(t) = 1   F (t), we can formulate the unit-step function as the
reliability function when there is evidence such that H(tF   t) = 1 when t  tF and
H(tF   t) = 0 otherwise, where tF is the time failure was observed in the evidence
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set. As a result, the reliability function will make a jump from 1 to 0 at the specific
time the component failed, and we can use this unit-step function directly in the
likelihood, modifying Eq. 4.6 to
fSj(t j Sj) = 
X
8Oi2E8Oi2Aj
@RSj(t)
@ROi(t)
 dH(tOi   t)
dt
 
X
8Sk2Aj8Sk 62E
@RSj(t)
@RSk(t)
 dRSk(t)
dt
 
X
8Cl2Aj8Cl 62E
@RSj(t)
@RCl(t)
 dRCl(t)
dt
(4.7)
This modification introduces steps into the reliability function of components
based on the evidence observed. As Eq. 4.7 is the PDF of time to failure of an
observed node, it is equivalent to the likelihood function for each observation given
observations and reliability parameters from the next lower level nodes, that is, the
set of nodes in Aj , and each observed variable constitutes a subset of variables that
is d-separated from the rest of the Bayesian network, therefore
LSj(tj j j;Aj) =fSj(t j Sj) =  
dRSj(t)
dt

t=tj
= 
X
8Oi2E8Oi2Aj
@RSj(t)
@ROi(t)
 dH(tOi   t)
dt

t=tj
 
X
8Sk2Aj8Sk 62E
@RSj(t)
@RSk(t)
 dRSk(t)
dt

t=tj
 
X
8Cl2Aj8Cl 62E
@RSj(t)
@RCl(t)
 dRCl(t)
dt

t=tj
= 
X
8Oi2E8Oi2Aj
@RSj(t)
@ROi(t)
 dH(tOi   t)
dt

t=tj
 
X
8Sk2Aj8Sk 62E
@RSj(t)
@RSk(t)
 fSk(tj j Sk)
 
X
8Cl2Aj8Cl 62E
@RSj(t)
@RCl(t)
 fCl(tj j Cl) (4.8)
where fSk(tj j Sk) is calculated as in Eq. 4.4, causing a recursive structure. Note that
we have as many conditionally independent likelihoods as the number of observed
variables. After identifying the d-separated network with respect to the evidence, we
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need to start from the last level of the network (the component level), and go to
the next upper level, this enabling us to use the recursive structure. If the observed
variable is a component, we can use the pdf of the component directly, instead of
Eq. 4.8.
Suppose m nodes are observed in a Bayesian network. The likelihood of observ-
ing the failure times of the observed components, E = ft1; : : : ; tmg given the set of
parameters that define the failure distributions of the components  = f1; : : : ; ng,
is defined below. The likelihood functions derived from the data set of each ob-
served component can be multiplied as they have been isolated into conditionally
independent sets of likelihoods.
L(E j ) = L(ft1; : : : ; tmg j f1; : : : ; ng) =
mY
k=1
Lk(tk j k;Ak) (4.9)
According to Bayesian inference, given the prior distribution of model parame-
ters, the posterior distributions can be obtained by
p( j E) / L(E j ) p() (4.10)
where p() is the joint prior distribution for system model parameters and p( j E) is
the joint posterior distribution of model parameters . The analysis of reliability as-
sessment and prediction will be based on this posterior distribution. After obtaining
the posterior distributions, we can make some assessments on the system reliability.
For this task, Peng et al. (2013) suggested calculating some measures, such as the fail-
ure rate of the system and reliability as a function of mission time. Therefore, based
on the system reliability function RS0(t) and the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters , the failure rate of the system at time t can be obtained from
S0(t j E) =
Z

fS0(t j )
RS0(t j )
p( j E)d (4.11)
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where E denotes the available simultaneous data. fS0(t j ),RS0(t j ) and S0(t j E)
are separately the PDF, reliability function, and failure rate of the system.
Given that the system has survived up to the present time tp, the probability that
the system will survive another interval of mission time t can be calculated by
R(tp +t j tp; E) =
Z

R(t+ tp j )
R(tp j ) p( j E)d (4.12)
Similar to the joint posterior distribution of parameters, Eq. 4.11 and 4.12 can-
not be specified analytically. The MCMC is used to collect samples from these dis-
tributions. By substituting the generated posterior samples into the corresponding
PDF and reliability functions above, samples for these reliability measures are ob-
tained. Summary statistics can be easily obtained based on these random samples.
For instance, the integrations above are approximated by the mean of relative sam-
ples. Moreover, the variances and confidence intervals for these measures can be
obtained within this Bayesian framework as well.
When a new system is running, it is necessary to predict system reliability at fu-
ture time points. Such predictions are usually adopted to set strategies for system
operation and warranty. Therefore, the reliability as a function of mission time is
obtained from
R(t j E) =
Z

R(t j )p( j E)d (4.13)
Similar to Eq. 4.11 and 4.12, Eq. 4.13 above have no analytical forms. The
calculations are based on the posterior samples of model parameters using simulation
based integration.
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4.3.5 Integrating Incomplete Hybrid Data Structures by Bayesian Inference
Restricting our attention to models containing only discrete or only continuous
variables might be very unrealistic in real applications. Therefore, we need to also
consider Bayesian inference with overlapping hybrid data structures.
The proposed framework with hybrid data structure can be summarized as fol-
lows: Our BN model combines high-level system functionality data with low-level
component failure time data. System node indicates whether the system is working
as intended. We observe a system’s functionality and there are sensors on some (not
all) of the components of the system. When we observe if a system is working or
failed, we analyze the components. The sensors on the components record the fail-
ure times of these components. As a result, we have discrete data from the system,
and continuous life time data from the components.
System reliability problems typically have two types of information, component
tests and system tests. However, in the literature, these component tests and system
tests are modeled separately because they are independent tests. In this research, we
seek a model which provides flexibility for incorporating both types of information
coming from the same test, making the data simultaneous. As stated previously,
dealing with simultaneous data is not a trivial task, and integrating data and prior
information at different levels within a BN has often proven problematic from both
the perspectives of computational tractability and model consistency.
We can consider the pass/fail data coming from the system as censored observa-
tions. When we observe a system has failed, we do not know the exact failure time,
but we know that the system failed within that time period. So we can consider it as
a left-censored observation. On the other hand, when we observe that the system is
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still functioning, we know that it has not failed until that time, so we can consider it
as a right-censored observation. The contribution of a right-censored observation to
the likelihood function is the reliability function, (1 F (t)), evaluated at the censored
value at the appropriate level in the Bayesian network; whereas the contribution of a
left-censored value observation is F (t), the cumulative distribution function. Incor-
porating censored data into our model framework is thus straightforward and can
be accomplished by simply substituting the appropriate expression for the censored
observation for the system in Eq.4.9.
As a result, if we observe that the system has failed, then the likelihood of the
corresponding observation is
LS0(tS0 j ;A0) = pS0 jt=tS0
where pS0 is a function of conditional probabilities and failure distributions of the
components in the next lower level (A0), just as explained in Section 4.3.4. If we ob-
serve that the system is still functioning at a specific mission time, then the likelihood
of the corresponding observation is
LS0(tS0 j ;A0) = 1  pS0jt=tS0
In the continuous data case, we use the chain rule of calculus, by splitting the
derivation in 3 different parts, which makes it easier to incorporate evidence from
the lower level. However, in this case, since we only need the failure function, not
the probability density function, we do not need to calculate derivatives as in Eq. 19.
Therefore, we do not need to take the derivative of the unit step function,H(tOi  t),
which represents the jump in reliability function of an observed variable. The key
point here is that we only need to substitute 1 for H(tOi   t) when t  tOi and 0
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otherwise for observed variables while calculating pS0 from the Bayesian network
structure.
4.4 Illustrative Example
Reliability assessment and prediction for missiles in a guidance system is carried
out in this section to demonstrate the proposed Bayesian network approach, which
was also studied by Jackson (2011) as a fault tree. A missile has a guidance system to
allow it to steer and change course towards its intended target, and also a propulsion
system that self-drives it. The missile’s flight path can be guided by use of guidance
information transmitted from the control point via. As a result, guidance systems
improve the performance of themissile, which is themissile accuracy. Over the years,
more and more sophisticated systems have been developed to implement guidance
control rules. Accordingly, operation and management of a guided missile system
requires precise assessment and prediction of the system reliability using available
data and information.
4.4.1 The Guided Missile System Structure
Every missile guidance system consists of an attitude control system and a flight
path control system. The attitude control system functions to maintain the missile
in the desired attitude on the ordered flight path by controlling the missile in pitch.
The attitude control system operates as an auto-pilot, damping out fluctuations that
tend to deflect the missile from its ordered flight path. The function of the flight
path control system is to determine the flight path necessary for target interception
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and to generate the orders to the attitude control system to maintain that path. The
reliability block diagram (RBD) of a simplified system structure is depicted in Figure
16, where subsystem S1 represents flight-path control, subsystem S2 represents atti-
tude control and component C6 represents the power supply. The system consists
of two subsystems and a component: with S1 and S2 being parallel structures, and
C6 being a component connected in series to subsystems S1 and S2. Note that S3 is
a series structure and is one of the parallel components of subsystem S1.
Figure 16. Reliability block diagram of a simplified missile guidance system.
4.4.2 Bayesian Network Model for the Guided Missile with Incomplete Data
In our case study, our focus is on a new guided missile system being tested and
it has sensors embedded that relay information back to a ground station. We model
the system as a Bayesian network (see Figure 17). Note that, we need to add nodes
for the subsystems and system while constructing a BN, even though they are not
actual components (Bobbio et al., 2001). In this system, we can only monitor 3 nodes:
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system node (S0), subsystem S1 and component C5. We get discrete data from S0
and continuous data from S1 and C5 such that: We observe the state of the system
at a specific time (functional or failed), and then we analyze the components with
sensors, which provide lifetime data from the components.
Figure 17. BN representation of the missile guidance system.
As described in Fig. 15, the first step is to define parametric models for the
components of the guided missile system. Prior information exists for the reliabil-
ity parameters from previous testing regimes and expert solicitation. The exponen-
tial distribution is adapted to model the reliability of components C1, C4, C5 and
C6 as Ti  Exponential(i),i = 1; 4; 5; 6. The 2-parameter Weibull distribution
is employed to model the lifetime of the component C2 as T2  Weibull(2; 2).
Its CDF is given as FC2(t j 2; 2) = 1   e 

t
2
2
. The Lognormal distribution
is used to model the reliability of component C3 as T3  Lognormal(3; 3) with
FC3(t j 3; 3) = 12
h
1 + erf

lnt 3
3sqrt(2)
i
. The selection of these reliability models
for the components is based on their respective goodness-of-fit test of these mod-
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els, and the testimony of experts. Therefore, the parameter vector is defined as
 = f1; 2; 2; 3; 3; 4; 5; 6g.
Meanwhile, the prior information is quantify into prior distributions for themodel
parameters given above. The prior is based on the testimony of experts and infor-
mation from previous guided missiles. The priors used in this example are depicted
in Table 15.
Table 15. Missile guidance system’s basic component reliability characteristics.
Components Parameters Priors
1 1 0(1) = Gamma(0:5; 0:15)
2
2 0(2) = Uniform(2; 3)
2 0(2) = Uniform(100; 150)
3
3 0(3) = Uniform(10; 250)
3 0(3) = Gamma(1; 0:007)
4 4 0(4) = Uniform(0:01; 0:04)
5 5 0(5) = Uniform(0; 0:02)
6 6 0(6) = Uniform(0; 0:1)
Suppose we know that components C2 and C3 are connected to in series (forming
subsystem S3), S3 and component C1 are connected to in parallel (forming subsys-
tem S1), and components C4 and C5 are connected in parallel (forming subsystem
S2). However, the system is connected to subsystems S1, S2 and component C6 by a
probabilistic gate. We are interested in exploring how this structure affects the work-
ing mechanism between the system and its components and we would like to make
inferences about reliability parameters of all the components with data coming from
a limited number of nodes (only 3 nodes: S0, S1 and C5).
We start by determining the d-separated structures in the Bayesian network as
explained in Section 4.3 (see Figure 18) with respect to the evidence. In Figure 18,
L1(t j ), L2(t j ) and L3(t j ) are the likelihoods of the evidence for each node.
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The multilevel system structure of the guided missile is modeled following the
substitution strategy depicted in Fig. 15 and Eq. 4.7. The reliability function of the
system depends on the reliability of components through the probabilistic gate of
the BN model.
Figure 18. Three conditionally independent subsystems given S0, S1 and C5.
Using Ci = 0(1) to denote that component i is working (not working), the rela-
tionships given in Eq. 4.14 describing the dependence among the components are
used to fully specify the Bayesian network.
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 1; S2 = 1; C6 = 1) = p111 = 0:9
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 0; S2 = 1; C6 = 1) = p011 = 0:4
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 1; S2 = 0; C6 = 1) = p101 = 0:3
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 1; S2 = 1; C6 = 0) = p110 = 0:5
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 0; S2 = 0; C6 = 1) = p001 = 0:1
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 1; S2 = 0; C6 = 0) = p100 = 0:05
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 0; S2 = 1; C6 = 0) = p010 = 0:25
Pr(S0 = 1 j S1 = 0; S2 = 0; C6 = 0) = p000 = 0 (4.14)
The reliability functions of the system S0 and subsystems S1, S2 and S3 are ob-
tained as follows (Note that pi(t) is the failure probability of basic components such
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that i = 1; : : : ; 6).
RS0(t) = 1  pS0(t)
RS1(t) = 1  pS1(t)
RS2(t) = 1  pS2(t)
RS3(t) = 1  pS3(t) (4.15)
where
pS0(t) =p111pS1(t)pS2(t)p6(t) + p011(1  pS1(t))pS2(t)p6(t) + p101pS1(t)(1  pS2(t))p6(t)
+ p110pS1(t)pS2(t)(1  p6(t)) + p001(1  pS1(t))(1  pS2(t))p6(t)
+ p100pS1(t)(1  pS2(t))(1  p6(t)) + p010(1  pS1(t))pS2(t)(1  p6(t))
+ p000(1  pS1(t))(1  pS2(t))(1  p6(t))
pS1(t) =p1(t)pS3(t) = p1(t)[p2(t) + p3(t)  p2(t)p3(t)]
pS2(t) =p4(t)p5(t)
pS3(t) =p2(t) + p3(t)  p2(t)p3(t)
and failure functions of the basic components are formulated by their CDFs. In our
proposed method, we formulate the likelihood functions for each observed node
starting with the lowest level (component level) of the Bayesian network, making it
easier to use the functional relationships since the reliability of the nodes depend on
the next lower level.
Next, we collect the evidence. The evidence is simulated with respect to the
reliability distributions of the components, as represented in Table 16.
For calculating the likelihood function, L(E j ), we need to formulate the relia-
bility functions of the nodes with evidence data. As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, we
use a specific form of step function for representing evidence. When the evidence
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is observed, it changes the form of the distribution function and therefore reliability
function of the corresponding observed variable. When we are calculating the pdf
of an upper level node with observation in the lower level nodes, we need to substi-
tute H(tOi   t) with the reliability function of the observed node. For example, for
test #4, we use H(51  t) for node S1 and H(16  t) for node C5. Note that we do
not need to use the step function for node S0, as it is the last level of the Bayesian
network and the causal flow stops at the system level.
Table 16. Simulated evidence data. (Data with superscript (p for pass) are
right-censored observations where the unit worked at the specific time. Data with
superscript (f for fail) are left-censored observations where the unit has failed.)
Test # fS0; S1; C5g
1 f20(p); 20(p); 17g
2 f40(p); 40(p); 28g
3 f60(p); 60(p); 1g
4 f80(f); 51; 16g
5 f100(f); 100(p); 41g
6 f120(f); 120(f); 27g
7 f140(f); 19; 63g
8 f160(f); 28; 82g
9 f180(f); 180(p); 180(p)g
10 f200(f); 175; 34g
As a result, the reliability function will make a jump from 1 to 0 at the specific time
the component failed, and we can use this unit-step function directly in the likelihood
calculations. We calculate the likelihoods starting with the component level and then
going upwards towards the system level.
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L1(t j ;Aj) =fC5(t = 16) = 5e 165
L2(t j ;Aj) =fS1(t = 51) =  
dRS1(t)
dt

t=51
=  @RS1(t)
@RS3(t)
 dRS3(t)
dt

t=51
  @RS1(t)
@RC1(t)
 dRC1(t)
dt

t=51
=[p2(51) + p3(51)  p2(51)p3(51)] fC1(51)
+ [p1(51)(1  p3(51))(f2(51))] fC2(51)
+ [p1(51)(1  p3(51))(f2(51))] fC3(51)
L3(t j ;Aj) = pS0(t = 80)
= p111pS1(80)pS2(80)p6(80) + p011(1  pS1(80))pS2(80)p6(80)
+ p101pS1(80)(1  pS2(80))p6(80) + p110pS1(80)pS2(80)(1  p6(80))
+ p001(1  pS1(80))(1  pS2(80))p6(80) + p100pS1(80)(1  pS2(80))(1  p6(80))
+ p010(1  pS1(80))pS2(80)(1  p6(80)) + p000(1  pS1(80))(1  pS2(80))(1  p6(80))
(4.16)
where pS1(80) = 1 and p5(80) = 1 are substituted as evidence from lower levels.
Then the joint likelihood function of the system is obtained. With the prior dis-
tributions given in Table 15, the joint posterior distribution for model parameters of
the guided missile is given as
p( j E) / L(E j ) p() (4.17)
where L(E j ) is calculated from the multiplication of likelihoods of the 10 test
datasets, each of which is calculated by Eq. 4.16.
The next step is sampling from the posterior distribution of the model. As de-
scribed in Section 4.4, the assessment and prediction of the system reliability are car-
ried out by generating samples from the joint posterior distribution in Eq. 4.17. The
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WinBUGS software is used to implement the sampling procedure. 220; 000 samples
were generated from this joint posterior distribution with 20; 000 samples for burn-
in and then every other sample was kept (to reduce the auto-correlation of drawn
samples) until there were 100; 000 draws from the joint posterior distribution. The
posterior sample statistics of the model parameters are summarized in Table 17.
Table 17. Summary statistics of the posterior samples for the parameters.
Mean SD 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
1 3:3476 4:6711 0:009227 0:3653 1:561 4:435 16:68
2 2:5177 0:2874 2:029 2:273 2:525 2:768 2:977
2 127:8334 13:8123 102:1 116:7 128:9 139:7 149
3 132:3514 69:1485 16:19 72:9875 133:5 192:3 244:3
3 122:8305 128:1004 3:231 34:45 82:35 166:9 473:9024
4 0:01947 0:007456 0:0103 0:01332 0:01762 0:02419 0:03695
5 0:01143 0:005074 0:002014 0:007409 0:01162 0:01572 0:01956
6 0:01167 0:01089 0:000326 0:003664 0:008554 0:01642 0:04043
4.4.3 Reliability Assessment and Prediction
Let us assume that we are analyzing a new system. Given the system has survived
up to the present time (tp = 10), our primary interest is on the reliability of the
guided missile at this point in time. According to Eqs. 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 derived in
Section 4.3.4, the reliability and the failure rate of the system at the present time, and
the probability that the system will survive another mission timet = 5 are obtained
and presented in Table 18. The results are obtained based on 100; 000 posterior
samples. The simulation based integration method is implemented.
Suppose a new system is going to be launched, and we are interested in the relia-
bility of this new system. The mean value for the predicted reliability distribution of
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the new guided missile is obtained and presented in Fig. 19. It is generated based on
the 100; 000 posterior samples using simulation based integration.
Table 18. Summary statistics for reliability assessment of the system.
Mean SD 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
S0(tp) 0:02787 0:01304 0:008779 0:01811 0:02582 0:03557 0:05798
RS0(tp + 5 j tp) 0:9051 0:0422 0:8011 0:8835 0:9135 0:9355 0:9622
RS0(tp) 0:7693 0:09899 0:551 0:7061 0:7801 0:8434 0:928
Figure 19. The reliability distribution of the new system with respect to mission
time.
4.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this chapter, a Bayesian network approach for integrating multilevel hetero-
geneous data sets for reliability assessment is developed. Our objective is to assess
failure distribution parameters of the components and make inferences and predic-
tions about system reliability. We start by developing the likelihood function for
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overlapping continuous datasets coming from some of the nodes (not all) in the net-
work. Next, we extend this case by adding pass/fail data and provide a coherent
framework for integrating multilevel heterogeneous data sets. We calculate some
reliability measures like predicted reliability and failure rate of the system using an
integration by simulation based method on the proposed Bayesian network frame-
work. These measures could be use during decision making for system operation
and management.
A key aspect of our method is the ability to incorporate heterogeneous over-
lapping data. Non-overlapping data ignores the dependencies between the datasets
and removes useful information; and therefore using overlapping data is crucial in
a Bayesian network framework. An overlapping data likelihood function was devel-
oped to incorporate these inherent dependencies through the use of Bayesian infer-
ence. A case study was demonstrated to highlight the effect of overlapping data and
how it can be used to correctly improve our knowledge about the failure distribution
parameters of the system.
The basis of our methodology is specifying the conditional independencies im-
posed by the Bayesian network using d-separation of the nodes. We use d-separation
to formulate the conditionally independent likelihoods coming from overlapping
data. The hierarchical system representation provides a good system structure so that
we can separate the paths of influence easily through d-separation. For future work,
we plan to work on more complex system structures. In our current framework, the
components only belong to a certain subsystem. However, in reality, subsystems
might share some components. The d-separation structure will change with a more
complex system. Therefore, it will be more challenging to formulate the likelihood
function.
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Another area of future research could be to estimate the distributions of condi-
tional probabilities. In this work, we assumed a given system structure and condi-
tional probabilities. We would like to analyze situations where the conditional proba-
bilities are unknown and their distributions need to be estimated from the likelihood
data.
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Chapter 5
A BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK FOR INCORPORATING DIFFERENT
SOURCES OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IN RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
5.1 Introduction and Background
Bayesianmethods growmore andmore complex as the systems get larger, causing
an increase in the complexity of the computational methods used. Using conjugate
priors somewhat overcomes this complexity problem and provides us with exact
form solutions. However, when the data come from different sources and in differ-
ent structures, it becomes impossible to use conjugate priors. Therefore, Bayesian
researchers are showing more interest in working with non-conjugate priors. As
a result, it becomes imperative that elicitation of prior distributions from different
resources be done effectively. Eliciting prior distributions is rather important for
representing prior knowledge more accurately and comprehensively. Thus, there is a
need to develop a methodology to elicit complex, non-standard distributions coming
from different sources. Although there is a broad literature in elicitation techniques,
there is still a lot of aspects to consider for further research.
Bayesian statistical methods are based on the personal (or subjective) interpre-
tation of probability. Bayesian prior and posterior distributions describe the uncer-
tainties in the unknown parameters of the statistical model. Point estimates of pa-
rameters do not capture the uncertainty in the assessment of parameters. Therefore,
Bayesian models are used to represent and quantify uncertainties and dependencies
of the parameters of a complex model.
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However, reliability data is not usually available for new systems or systems with
modifications, so the use of expert judgment is unavoidable. In the simplest case
there is only one expert. In order to include as much information as possible in the
model, analysts often try to combine the distributions of several experts.
The aim of our research in this paper is to obtain as much from data (from com-
ponents and system) as we can, and to elicit expert opinion accurately and combine
these different streams of data to derive prior distributions for the parameters of
a Bayesian model. An advantage of using Bayesian models in this context is that
we can incorporate “non-data information” (also called pseudo-data) into the model.
The pseudo-data can take the form of elicited data from the experts.
There are two big challenges to the problem of combining prior information.
The first challenge is that specifying prior distributions for systems comprising of
many components requires special thought. In the system reliability context, the
reliability and lifetime of systems are functions of the parameters of the components.
Therefore, the prior distributions specified on the parameters of components induce
prior distributions on the reliability and lifetime of systems. Wemight also have direct
prior information on the system parameters. Consequently, if we also have prior
information about the reliability or lifetime of systems, we need a way to combine the
information. There might be even cases when these two streams may have conflicts,
so we also need to reconcile any difference between them. Guo (2011) used the
Bayesian melding method for this problem, which was originally proposed by (Poole
and Raftery, 2000). The second challenge comes from handling the pseudo-data.
Quantifying non-data information is not always straightforward especially when it
comes from expert opinions and it must be handled with care. Therefore, there is
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a need for a solid method to convert expert opinions to equivalent pseudo data for
quantifying and combining prior opinions.
Our motivation for this paper is the lack of a solid unified approach for quan-
tifying expert opinions and combining these with data coming from other sources
to obtain a prior distribution for the system being studied. We propose a Bayesian
methodology that incorporates different sources of prior information and reconciles
these different sources, such as expert opinions and component information in or-
der to form a prior distribution for the system. The next section presents some
background information about obtaining prior distributions from the literature.
5.1.1 Elicitation Techniques
Elicitation of prior distributions is a key task for the Bayesian methodology. It is
the process of formulating beliefs about uncertain quantities into a probability distri-
bution for those quantities. That is, it converts an expert’s opinions into a statistical
expression of these opinions. In the context of Bayesian models, elicitation mostly
arises as a method for specifying the prior distribution for the unknown parameters
of the model. In the literature, the first methods involved choosing hyperparam-
eters using conjugate prior families. With the advance in Bayesian computational
methods, such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), researchers are now able to
obtain posterior distributions in the case of non-conjugate priors. However, differ-
ent techniques may produce different distributions because the method of elicitation
may have some effect on the way the expert states his opinions (Smith and Win-
kler, 1967). Bayesian modeling with informative priors based on expert opinion can
provide very useful for reliability analysts (Garthwaite and O’Hagan, 2000).
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In Bayesian statistical modeling, expert elicitation refers to the process of ob-
taining expert opinion, together with uncertainty, which is then carefully formulated
into informative prior distributions (O’Hagan et al., 2006). The main steps involved
in elicitation as experienced by the expert are well documented (see Garthwaite and
O’Hagan (2000); Clemen and Reilly (2013); Renooij (2001); Walls andQuigley (2001);
Jenkinson (2005)). Direct approaches ask experts directly about parameters in the
model, so experts not only require adequate statistical understanding of the role of
parameters in the underlying model, but their knowledge should also be easily com-
municated in this way. That is why sometimes a facilitator (also called analyst or
decision maker) is appointed to handle the conversion of the expert opinion to sta-
tistical form. In contrast, indirect approaches ask experts only about what they have
observed. This typically involves asking experts to predict the response given partic-
ular scenarios, such as in a regression model for known covariate values.
Common approaches elicit quantiles at fixed probabilities or alternately elicit
probabilities of fixed quantiles (O’Hagan, 1998). Other summary statistics may be
elicited, such as moments and the mode or changes to estimates in light of hypo-
thetical new information. Once the summary statistics about the unknown quantity
has been quantified using expert knowledge, then it is necessary to estimate the prior
distribution of that quantity. In most cases additional information about expert un-
certainty is required, such as the equivalent sample size of their knowledge, in order
to estimate the variance of prior distributions.
There has been considerable debate about using subjective opinion to construct
priors (Cox, 2000; O’Hagan et al., 2006). However, representation of probabilities
and uncertainty under Bayesian inference contains a subjective element (Lindley,
2000; Dawid et al., 2004), and other choices such as model and data are similarly
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subjective (Pearce et al., 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002). An advantage of the Bayesian in-
ference is that it requires subjective information in the form of priors to be stated
explicitly and precisely before modeling (Wintle et al., 2003).
Despite abundant research on elicitation techniques, research into methods for
quantifying expert opinion has never kept pace with the growing importance of
Bayesian methods and we aim to reduce this deficit. As more and more Bayesian
belief networks are being developed for complex real-life problem domains, it is be-
coming increasingly apparent that the construction of the qualitative part with the
help of domain experts is feasible; the elicitation of the large number of probabilities
required, however, is a far harder task. In fact, the elicitation of probabilities is often
referred to as a major obstacle in building complex Bayesian models. Most meth-
ods tend to be time-consuming that it is infeasible to apply them when hundreds of
probabilities are to be assessed, especially for very complex models. Faster elicitation
methods are available, but are prone to even more biased answers. Renooij (2001)
presented an overview of some of the issues to consider when relying on expert judg-
ments and described the methods that are available for expert elicitation, along with
their benefits and drawbacks. They discussed various issues that are to be taken into
consideration when faced with the task of probability elicitation.
Garthwaite and O’Hagan (2000) proposed modeling approaches to use the
elicited assessments to form subjective probability distributions. They performed
statistical analysis to evaluate the objective accuracy of elicited distributions. Accord-
ing to their study, eliciting quantiles is the most common approach to estimating the
spread of an expert’s subjective distribution.
O’Hagan and Oakley (2004) outlined a Bayesian technique that allows the impre-
cision in elicitation to be formulated explicitly. They assumed the expert’s true proba-
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bility distribution is unknown to the analyst and represented the uncertainty about the
expert’s distribution as being the analyst’s uncertainty. Oakley and O’Hagan (2007)
also presented a non-parametric Bayesian analysis from this perspective. In their
study, the analyst’s prior beliefs about the expert’s probability density function were
represented by a prior distribution. These beliefs were then updated by Bayes’ the-
orem, treating the expert’s elicited summaries as data. Then the expert’s probability
density function can be estimated by the analyst’s posterior mean.
O’Hagan et al. (2006) addressed applied approaches to extract information and
distributional forms for use in modeling and prediction. They emphasized using dis-
tributional summaries such as probabilities, quantiles, intervals, location measures,
scale and dispersion measures and measures of shape, all of which can be used as
frameworks for developing survey questions in an elicitation process. They analyzed
the problem of extracting critical information from experts, which will then be com-
bined with observed data to build statistical models which can be used for prediction
and inference.
In their paper Choy et al. (2009) outlined a framework for statistical design of
expert elicitation processes for quantifying expert knowledge, in a form suitable for
input as prior information into Bayesian models for ecological applications. They
demonstrated the steps that need to be taken in the elicitation process, providing a
useful overall description of elicitation design.
O’Hagan (2012) provided an overview and an outline of the process of eliciting
knowledge from experts in probabilistic form. They explored approaches to proba-
bilistic uncertainty specification including direct elicitation and Bayesian analysis.
Another major problem in prior knowledge elicitation is that, most of the relia-
bility models are not able to account for prior expert opinion and data when such
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information is simultaneously obtained at several levels within a system. In many
applications, expert opinion plays an important role in assessing system reliability,
especially in large complex systems for which data collected on components may
be sparse. However, Bayesian researchers overlooked the problem of incorporating
pseudo-data information coming from expert opinions. Furthermore, expert opin-
ion may be available from several experts, and the quality of information obtained
from each expert may vary. Johnson et al. (2003) assumed that the prior density ob-
tained from an expert concerning a specific probability takes the form of a beta den-
sity, and obtained point estimates for the probability value from each expert. They
assigned an expert precision parameter for each expert and assumed that each ex-
pert precision parameter was drawn from a gamma density with known parameters.
For example, if the posterior mean for the distribution of precision parameter of an
expert is 12:2, this suggests that the expert’s opinion is worth approximately 12 full
system tests. As a result, their method simply treated expert opinion as “imprecisely-
observed” data.
Another method for integrating pseudo-data into the assessment of prior distri-
butions in literature is the “equivalent prior sample (EPS) method” (Garthwaite et al.,
2005). In the EPS method, an expert expresses his or her knowledge as an equiv-
alent prior sample. However, Garthwaite et al. (2005) also stated that this method
might tend to produce prior distributions that are unrealistically tight. Experts might
equate their knowledge to too large a sample size because they might not realize the
value of sample information. As a result, specification of a “prior sample” whose
information content would approximately equate to an expert’s knowledge is not a
straightforward task, and there is also need for an objective method for relating an
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expert’s opinion to an equivalent prior sample size. As a result, in our work, we
would like to also explore the pseudo data and pseudo sample size method.
5.1.2 Verification and Validation of Experts
In this research, we define “expert” as someone that has special knowledge about
the subject that we are interested in eliciting opinion about. For the sake of a more
formal definition, Czembor et al. (2011) defined an expert as someone with:
• A minimum of 5 years of education, research experience or technical training
in the specific application.
• High levels of theoretical and/or practical experience working in the specific
application.
• Published research on the topic in peer-reviewed journals or reports.
• Peer nomination of being an expert.
The process of expert elicitation is basically about extracting beliefs from some-
one with knowledge and experience. A Bayesian model might be dominated by ex-
pert opinions, especially in case of scarce data; therefore, proper verification and
validation of the experts should be be conducted. There are various techniques for
evaluating the experts in the literature. According to Kadane and Wolfson (1998),
reliability, coherence and calibration components can be used to validate an expert.
The expert’s assessments should be coherent and valid such that his assessments
should follow the same pattern for the same variable. The reliability of an expert
depends on the performance of the expert and it can be measured. Finally, calibra-
tion deals with the bias component in the expert’s assessments and the biases can
be evaluated by setting some scoring rules (Refer to Morgan et al. (1992) for more
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details about scoring rules and measuring calibration.). Cooke (1991) defined scor-
ing as a numerical evaluation of probability assessments on the basis of observations.
Scoring is of great importance for evaluating expert opinions. The expert is scored
on the basis of his assessment and the observed value of that quantity. Cooke (1991)
discussed two basic properties for scoring: entropy and calibration.
Entropy is defined as a good measure of degree to which the density function
is spread out. Let H(P ) be the entropy associated with a probability density func-
tion and P (x) be the probability that the elicited parameter is x. When P (x) = 1,
H(P ) = 0; hence an expert whose probability function has low entropy is desired.
The entropy function is represented as
H(P ) =  
Z
P (x)ln(P (x))dx
In order to define the calibration, Cooke (1991) presented a statistical hypothesis:
C(P ) := the uncertain quantities are independent and identically distributed with the
probability density function (P ) provided by the expert. Let S be a sample distribu-
tion generated by observing the true values for all parameters. Then, the discrepancy
between S and P is given in the following equation.
I(S; P ) =
Z
S(x)ln
S(x)
P (x)
dx
As a result, calibration and entropy can be used to analyze expert probability
assessments. Usage of these techniques can open help the experts to get adjusted
to the process and give better assessments. It can be concluded that good experts
should have good entropy scores and good calibration scores. However, calibrat-
ing the bias might be very tricky and it should not be skipped during the validation
process. Experts are not usually accustomed to quantifying their beliefs, and there
might be a number of psychological issues that make the task difficult (Denham et al.,
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2007). Wolfson (1995) discussed some of the key psychological issues and biases
that commonly occur in the elicitation process.
The biases usually represent misperceptions of probabilities. There might also
be domain biases connected with experts’ preferences relating to their specific fields.
Identification of the bias errors generally require knowledge of the experts involved
the elicitation, and require substantial amount of data. Gavasakar (1988) introduced a
hierarchical model component to model elicitation errors. They tested the elicitation
methods by assuming that the prior distribution had a certain form, and then adding
random errors to what the answers should have been, given the specified prior. The
results from the elicitation were used to compare the estimated hyperparameters with
the true hyperparameters.
Overconfidence might be another cause of bias and might be the result of poor
calibration. As a result, calibration provides a form of control on experts and their
subjective probability assessments. There is always room for improvement for the
elicitation process and training in “elicitation of subjective probabilities” can be
worthwhile. Therefore, using suitable measures for calibration is a very important
step in the process of expert verification and validation.
5.1.3 Combination of Several Prior Distributions
In many applied problems, the construction of informative priors using expert
opinions is a delicate problem, because it might be difficult to quantify qualitative
knowledge for people (O’Hagan et al., 2006). With more than one expert, we may
elicit from each expert a different prior and in many situations it is desirable to com-
bine these different priors into a single “consensus” prior for the parameter . The
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more information you have, the better the results will be; therefore, it can be prefer-
able to elicit the opinions of several experts. However, what is often needed is not
a collection of different distributions but one distribution that represents the com-
bined opinion of the experts, the result of their combined expertise, that can be used
as a prior distribution in a Bayesian analysis. A good review of the issues surrounding
the combination of probability distributions is given by Clemen and Winkler (1999).
There are many possible ways of combining probability distributions, which can
be classified in 2 major approaches: mathematical and behavioral approaches. Our
scope is only on mathematical approaches in this research. Mathematical approaches
are also divided into two different approaches: axiomatic approaches (opinion pools)
and Bayesian approaches. The two main axiomatic approaches are the linear opinion
pool and the logarithmic opinion pool. There is a substantial literature on opinion
pooling. For a detailed review of this literature, refer to Genest and Zidek (1986);
Givens and Roback (1999); Jacobs (1995); O’Hagan et al. (2006). Let pi() represent
the ith expert’s probability density function and wi be the weight for the ith expert’s
opinion. Then, the linear opinion pool is given by
p() =
nX
i=1
wipi() (5.1)
with non-negative weights wi such that
Pn
i=1wi = 1. This combination method satis-
fies the ”marginalization property”, that is, for a multivariate  the marginal probabil-
ity from the combined density for any of the variables in  is the same as what is ob-
tained when the elicited marginal distributions for that variable are combined. Linear
pooling is the only combination method that satisfies the marginalization property.
The logarithmic opinion pool, on the other hand, is a weighted geometric mean
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of the densities such that
p() = k
nY
i=1
pi()
wi (5.2)
where k is the normalizing constant. The logarithmic method does not satisfy the
marginalization property; however, it does satisfy the ”external Bayesian” princi-
ple. The external Bayesian principle is satisfied if the result of updating the indi-
vidual expert distributions and then combining the updated distributions provides
the same posterior distribution as updating the combined distribution (Poole and
Raftery, 2000). Unlike the linear opinion pool, it is typically uni-modal and less dis-
persed. Thus, it is more likely to indicate consensual values, making it a preferable
option when experts’ elicited distributions are similar. Except in trivial cases, the
linear opinion pool fails to have this property, while the logarithmic pool does have
it, when the weights sum to one.
Despite its advantages, the logarithmic opinion pool suffers from the same prob-
lem as the linear opinion pool in that it lacks a standard method for choosing the
pooling weights. It also suffers from the fact that a single expert’s opinion that a
probability being zero implies that the pool must also assign zero probability to that
event.
Cooke (1991) described a method of choosing weights based on the experts’ per-
formance in assessing distributions for seed variables, which are quantities whose
true value is known to the facilitator but not to the experts. Weights are based on
p-values for evaluating how well expert assessments on seed variables align with em-
pirical results. This method produces better elicitation than equal weighting of the
experts (Cooke and Goossens, 2000). Cooke (1991) also generalized the pooling
methods by raising the individual densities to the rth power, taking a weighted aver-
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age, raising it to the 1=rth power and then multiplying by a constant to ensure that
the combined density integrates to one.
In conclusion, the linear and logarithmic opinion pools have both their advan-
tages and disadvantages and it is not possible to find an opinion pooling method
that satisfies all good qualities like the externally Bayesian and the marginalization
criteria, without making any assumptions.
A quite different approach to combiningmultiple experts’ opinions together is the
Bayesian approach, which involves experts giving information about certain events
or quantities to a decision maker (DM - sometimes called a supra-Bayesian) who
then updates a prior distribution using Bayes’ Theorem. There are difficulties with
obtaining the likelihood function required by the Bayesian methods (Clemen and
Winkler, 1990). From the viewpoint of the DM, the opinions expressed by the ex-
perts are ”data”. The DM combines the probability distributions provided by the
experts with his own prior distribution using Bayes’ rule. Therefore, in the supra-
Bayesian method, the pooling operator becomes the Bayes’ rule and the DM’s pos-
terior distribution is the combined distribution. However, selecting the DM’s prior
might be problematic. Moreover, defining an appropriate likelihood function for the
experts’ opinions can be tedious and computationally expensive. However, due to
the advancements in Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, we can nowa-
days evaluate complex posterior distributions. For example, Gelfand et al. (1995)
modeled the likelihood function for the experts’ opinions as a finite mixture of Beta
distributions, and used Gibbs sampling to evaluate the DM’s posterior distribution.
O’Hagan and Oakley (2004) and Oakley and O’Hagan (2007) both outlined a
supra-Bayesian technique and assumed the experts’ true probability distribution is
unknown to the DM and represented the uncertainty about the experts’ distribution
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as being the DM’s uncertainty. In both their studies, the DM’s prior beliefs about
the expert’s probability density function were updated by Bayes’ theorem, treating
the expert’s elicited summaries as data. Then they estimated the expert’s probability
density function by the DM’s posterior mean.
There are several different approaches to the problem of combining prior distri-
butions in the literature. Savchuk and Martz (1994) developed Bayes estimators for
the true binomial survival probability p when there exist multiple sources of prior
information. For each source of prior information, incomplete (partial) prior infor-
mation is assumed to exist in the form of either a prior mean of p or a prior credibility
interval on p. Both maximum entropy and maximum posterior risk criteria are used
to determine a beta prior for each source. A mixture of these beta priors is then
taken as the combined prior, after which Bayes theorem is used to obtain the final
mixed beta posterior distribution. Pulkkinen (1993) also discussed the problem of
combining expert probability distributions. Their approach was based on the use of
information theory. They derived combination procedures based on minimization
of the sums of the Kullback-information between the expert distributions and the
aggregated distribution. Pulkkinen and Holmberg (1997) described a method for us-
ing expert judgments, in which the combination of experts judgments is based on a
Bayesian framework utilizing hierarchic models. The posterior distributions were de-
termined by applying MCMCmethods. Lipscomb et al. (1998) adopted a hierarchical
approach that reflects a different statistical perspective on how to conceptualize and
model the expert judgment synthesis problem within the supra-Bayesian framework.
They presented a general approach to opinion pooling based on hierarchical model-
ing. Rosqvist (2000) used a Bayesian aggregation approach for experts’ judgments
on the failure intensity function of repairable systems. Their Bayesian statistical ap-
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proach yielded posterior distributions of the parameters of the Power Law and the
Log-Linear intensity functions using MCMC methods.
5.2 Methodology
In our approach, we deviate from the traditional approaches of averaging and
pooling, by treating the elicited information as data and converting these pseudo
data to equivalent samples of observations. Our prior combination model is based
on a Bayesian approach. In this section, we will incorporate different experts with
different confidence levels (that is, different pseudo sample sizes), we also combine
the pseudo data with actual data coming from the components of the system, which
will also induce a prior on the system parameters.
5.2.1 Incorporating Priors From Experts
In Bayesian probability theory, if the posterior distributions p( j x) are in the
same family as the prior probability distribution p(), the prior and posterior are
then called conjugate distributions, and the prior is called a conjugate prior for the
likelihood function. For example, the Gaussian family is conjugate to itself with
respect to a Gaussian likelihood function: if the likelihood function is Gaussian,
choosing a Gaussian prior will ensure that the posterior distribution is also Gaussian.
This means that the Gaussian distribution is a conjugate prior for the likelihood that
is also Gaussian.
A conjugate prior gives a closed-form expression for the posterior in Bayesian
analysis; otherwise a difficult numerical integration may be necessary. Conjugate
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priors also show how a likelihood function updates a prior distribution. All members
of the exponential family have conjugate priors.
It is often useful to think of the hyperparameters of a prior distribution as corre-
sponding to having observed a certain number of pseudo-observations with proper-
ties specified by the parameters. This is the main logic we will follow in this work.
For example, the hyperparameters  and  of a beta distribution can be thought
of as corresponding to    1 successes and    1. In general, for nearly all conju-
gate prior distributions, the hyperparameters can be interpreted in terms of pseudo-
observations. This can help to choose reasonable hyperparameters for a prior in
a Bayesian framework. In a reliability based point of view, the failure probabilities
can well be represented by Beta distributions, so beta-binomial models are used ex-
tensively to model pass/fail data with a probability of failure modeled by a Beta
distribution. The Beta hyperparameters are often called pseudo-counts and there-
fore we can think of these hyperparameters as the number of times we have seen
the different outcomes (pass or fail) in our prior experience before seeing actual data
(Koller and Friedman, 2009). The total n = + of the pseudo-counts reflects how
confident we are in our prior, and is often called the equivalent sample size. The
relative magnitude of  +  therefore represents total weight of the pseudo-counts.
Christensen et al. (2011) calls the priors that allow the hyperparameters to be
represented as pseudo-samples as “data augmentation priors” (DAPs). For example,
the beta-binomial model is represented by the posterior distribution such that
p j x  Beta(x+ a; n  x+ b) (5.3)
where p is the failure probability, x is the observed number of failures in a test, n is
the total number of observations, and a and b are the hyperparameters of the prior
beta distribution for p. In the posterior p j x  Beta(x + a; n   x + b), the number
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of “failures” x and the hyperparameter from the prior a play similar roles. Also, the
number of “successes” n x and b play similar roles. Therefore, we can think of the
prior as augmenting the data with a failures and b successes out of a + b trials. In
DAPs, the prior density (p) has the same functional form as the sampling density
f(x j p) when viewed as a function of p.
However, assigning hyperparameters of a prior distribution might not reflect the
actual uncertainty of experts. An expert is not usually a statistician in reality, and in
most situations in reality, he is not. They might not understand the value of “sample
size”. It is usually an analyst who elicits experts’ estimates and converts them to
distributions. Therefore, after obtaining a prior distribution from the experts, we
need to calibrate the experts’ hyperparameters so that their uncertainty is represented
in the prior distribution as accurately as possible.
In many industrial applications, expert opinion plays an important role in assess-
ing system reliability, particularly in large complex systems because data collected on
specific components and the system might be sparse. Furthermore, expert opinion
may be available from several experts, and the quality of information obtained from
each expert may be different due to the difference in their expertise and confidence.
Incorporating expert knowledge into estimates of system reliability can therefore be
a complicated task. Our solution to this problem is to elicit information from ex-
perts in the form of pseudo-observations. We analyze the continuous data case, by
analyzing a gamma-exponential model and demonstrate how to incorporate several
expert opinions in our Bayesian framework.
In our framework, we assume that lifetime data and prior expert opinion are
available at different levels of the system, and that our primary goal is to evaluate the
system reliability function, R0(t j ), defined as the probability that the system will
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function beyond time t, given the value of a parameter vector . Ri(t j i) denotes
the reliability of the component i. We are also interested in assessing the posterior
distribution of the parameters, which are the failure distribution parameters of the
components.
Several sources of information relevant to estimating system reliability are incor-
porated into our model framework. The first is lifetime data collected at individual
components. The second is lifetime data collected at the system level. A third source
of information is expert opinion regarding the failure rate of particular components
and the system. That is, we ask each expert to provide a value for the failure rate
for each component. We could ask a question such as ”How often do you think
this component would fail?” We then formulate a prior distribution representing the
expert opinions, also including a “weight” parameter for each expert in the prior.
This “weight” parameter adjusts the precision of the information solicited from each
expert. We can elicit other quantities from the experts such as the failure probability,
or average lifetime for a component, and formulate our priors based on these quan-
tities. In this work, we choose to elicit the failure rate because it is directly related
the failure time distributions in our system.
We assume that the prior information obtained from expert e concerning the
lifetime distribution of component Ci can be formulated by a Gamma distribution
such that
Gamma(i j Ne + 1; Ne
i;e
)  (Ne=i;e)
Ne+1
 (Ne + 1)
Nei e
  Ne
i;e
i (5.4)
In Eq. 5.4, i;e represents the failure rate estimate that we get from expert e for
i, and Ne represents the weight assigned to information collected from expert e,
representing the number of observations assigned to the expert e’s assessment; that
is, the number of the pseudo-counts. The reason we derive the expert distribution
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as in Eq. 5.4 is due to the interpretation of hyperparameters of Gamma distribution.
Consider a gamma-exponential model such that
 j ti  Gamma( + n;  +
nX
i=1
ti)
where  is the failure rate, ti is the lifetime likelihood data, n is the number of lifetime
observations, and  and  are the hyperparameters of the gamma prior.  and n have
the same interpretation, and  and
Pn
i=1 ti have the same interpretation. Therefore,
the hyperparameters are interpreted as “ observations that sum to ”. As a result,
we calibrate the expert parameters such that it will correspond to the interpretation
of gamma priors.
We model Ne as a random parameter, by assigning a prior distribution to it. Ne
also represents the consistency of the expert’s assessment with observed data. We
assume that each expert weight parameter Ne is drawn from a gamma density with
parameters e and e, such that
Gamma(Ne j e; e)  
e
e
 (e)
Ne 1e e
 eNe (5.5)
LetE = ftig denote the test data available for constructing the likelihood function
and Ee = fi;eg denote the set containing expert e’s elicited opinion on component
i. Then the posterior distribution on model parameters is proportional to
p(;  j E) /
Y
8i
Y
t2Ei
[fi(ti j i)]
Y
8e
"
Ne 1e e
 eNe
Y
i2Ee
Nei e
  Ne
i;e
i
#
 ( j ) () (5.6)
where ( j ) is the hierarchical priors of the parameters coming from the com-
ponents and () is the hyper prior distribution on the . In 5.6, we represent the
system failure time distribution as a function of component life time distributions
with respect to the reliability structure posed by the system reliability block diagram.
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5.3 An Application to an Anti-Aircraft Missile System
As a simple demonstration of the proposed methodology, consider a weapon
system (previously studied by Guo (2011) and Reese et al. (2005b)). The system (C0)
works if all of the components (C1; C2; C3) work. The reliability block diagram for
this system is depicted in Figure 20, which shows that this system consists of three
components connected in series.
Figure 20. Reliability block diagram for a weapon system.
Test data available for estimating the reliability functions for this system are pro-
vided in Table 19. Twenty tests were conducted for each component, and ten system
tests were performed. Failure times for each test are depicted in the table.
Table 19. Test data.
Component Data (hours)
System (C0) 23:9; 18; 53:1; 27:6; 53:7; 34:5; 47:2; 25:7; 20:8; 7:1
C1 5:3; 65:9; 15:5; 39:4; 47:2; 28:2; 91:7; 33:6; 13:4; 13:9
117:7; 29:3; 35:5; 4:4; 150:4; 15:7; 47; 5:1; 23:5; 25:1
C2 65:5; 51:9; 120:2; 32; 51:5; 70:5; 37:7; 9:7; 78; 24:9
47:7; 46:6; 105:8; 70:5; 39:9; 29:8; 48:3; 25:4; 17:7; 27:6
C3 28:8; 51:3; 41:2; 59:2; 19:9; 57:5; 64:4; 15:7; 75; 35:2
57:5; 49:2; 18:2; 48:8; 57:5; 35:7; 29:4; 14:6; 46:2; 9
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Table 20. Expert opinions for the weapon system.
Component Expert Failure rate
C0 e1 0:03
C0 e2 0:02
C1 e1 0:01
C1 e2 0:01
C3 e2 0:01
Two experts provided prior assessments for the system or component failure
rates (see Table 20). Expert 1 provided information about the system and component
1. Expert 2 provided information about the system, and components 1 and 3. No
expert opinion is available for component 2. For example, expert 1 claims that the
failure rate of the system is 0:03 per hour. This means that expert 1 thinks that the
system will function for about 33 hours on average.
In this application, we use an Exponential distribution to model the component
failure times. The Exponential density for failure times for component Ci, i = 1; 2; 3,
is represented by
fi(t j i) = ie it (5.7)
so that i = fig. All values of i are drawn mutually independently from gamma
distributions; that is
(i j ; ) /  1i e i (5.8)
We assume that ;  have independent exponential distributions with mean 1.
We assigned a Gamma(5; 1) prior density to the expert weight parametersN1 andN2,
which means that each expert’s assessment is considered to be worth approximately
5 observations before observing the data.
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Figure 21. Posterior distributions of the reliability parameters.
Figure 22. Posterior reliability distributions of the system and components. The
solid line is the posterior mean and the dashed lines are the 90% credible interval.
To sample from the posterior distribution on model parameters and reliabilities,
we ran MCMC simulations through the Bayesian software package, WinBUGS. The
posterior distributions were based on 100; 000 draws from the joint posterior distri-
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Figure 23. Posterior distributions of the experts’ weight parameters. The solid line
is the posterior distribution for the first expert and the dashed line is the posterior
distribution for the second expert.
bution with a 20; 000 burn-in period. The posterior distribution for each parameter
is plotted in Figure 21. The reliability functions of the system and components are
plotted in Figure 22.
The posterior distributions for the expert precision parameters are depicted in
Figure 23. These plots suggest that assessments from expert 1 were more consistent
with observed data than were those from expert 2, due to the fact that the distribution
obtained from expert 1 is closer to 1. Parameters for both expert 1 and expert 2 turn
out to be less than 1, because the sample size of the data is much greater than the
number of expert assessments, thus dominating the likelihood. We can say that the
2 experts are worth around 1 system test.
In order to analyze the effect of priors on the posterior distribution, the simula-
tion was run with different prior distributions (see Figure 24).
According to Figure 24, the posterior distribution for the system failure rate was
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analyzed. In this comparison, four different models are compared: model with prior
specifications from components (without expert data), pseudo data method (with
expert data), logarithmic and linear opinion pools (using equal weights). As can
be seen from the figure, adding the pseudo data into the model clearly improves
the posterior. Linear opinion pool performs poorly, in terms of the variance and
precision. We can therefore conclude that prior distributions do have an effect on
the posterior distribution, and special care must be taken when combining priors in
a Bayesian model.
Figure 24. Posterior distributions of the failure rate given different priors.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a Bayesian framework for incorporating multiple
sources of prior information through the treatment of expert opinion as imprecisely-
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observed data (pseudo-data). Our proposed hierarchical model for system reliability
offers several advantages over other existing models for system reliability. Firstly,
incorporating expert opinion in the form of pseudo-observations substantially sim-
plifies statistical modeling. We can use the hierarchical priors directly in our Bayesian
model, without having to use a mathematical aggregation method to combine dif-
ferent priors. The linear and logarithmic pooling techniques and supra Bayesian
methods used for combining prior distributions in the literature require complex
calculations and might be tedious to work with. Therefore, converting the experts’
distributions to pseudo data proves as an effective method in a Bayesian framework.
Another advantage of our methodology is that experts are assigned a “weight”
parameter representing their pseudo sample size, thus calibrating the experts’ beliefs
with respect to their accuracy. We formulate this weight parameter as a random
variable with gamma distribution, and our hierarchical Bayesian model updates this
parameter with the likelihood data. This method is especially useful when we do not
have enough likelihood data, because it increases our observed sample size.
An example from the literature, a weapon system, is used as a case study in this
work. We present a gamma-exponential model, modeling the lifetime data with
Exponential distribution and parameters with Gamma priors. We elicit estimates
about the failure rate parameter of several components from each expert and derive
a Gamma distribution by calibrating the hyperparameters of the Gamma prior. As a
result, we were able to obtain posterior densities for both the failure parameters and
expert weight parameters.
In future work we plan to extend this framework to include more complex distri-
butions. We would like to analyze the case of non-conjugate priors. In this case,
assigning a prior distribution to the expert becomes more challenging, as it gets
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harder to evaluate the hyperparameters. Determining the pseudo sample size there-
fore might require more complicated calculations. We also would like to analyze
the situations in which we elicit different quantities than the failure rate from the ex-
perts, such as the failure probability during mission time. There might be situations
in which, our pseudo samples are discrete and our likelihood data are continuous,
thus causing a mixture likelihood. As a result, there are many scenarios to extend
this study to, creating many future research areas.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The fundamental problem that this dissertation addresses is the reliability analysis
of complex engineering systems through the use of Bayesian networks coupled with
Bayesian inference. In the preceding chapters, we present Bayesian methods for
assessing system reliability (Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) and for combining
prior distributions coming from different resources (Chapter 5). In this final chapter,
we summarize the main contributions and discuss promising directions for further
research.
6.1 Summary of Methods and Contributions
Chapter 2 proposes a Bayesian network model for assessing the system reliabil-
ity at the system’s early design stage. Information from parent products that was
stored as a function failure record are used for inference. In our framework, fail-
ure modes and failure causes represent the nodes of the Bayesian network, whereas
the conditional probabilities represent the dependencies between these causes and
modes. The objective is to quantify the relationships and dependencies between
failure modes and failure causes using historical records from parent products. A
Bayesian network methodology is provided for early reliability prediction problem
by integrating both objective and subjective reliability information. After analyzing
the functional dependencies in the system, these dependencies are established in a
Bayesian network model. Then, belief propagation is used to update the current
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knowledge about the system. Using our method, we can identify functions with high
failure risk and offer suggestions for improvement.
Chapter 3 also presents a Bayesian network methodology with a deeper analysis
of a complex system. In this chapter, the relationship of system/subsystem reliabil-
ity to its components are examined using simultaneous pass/fail data. Information
frommultiple sources and multiple levels of the system to infer the conditional prob-
abilities in a BN is combined. Firstly, a naïve scenario is presented where the com-
plete historical dataset of the states of the system and its components are available.
Then, this case is extended to a multi-state Bayesian network. Finally, the scenario
of incomplete lower-level system information is discussed. Since Bayesian networks
represent dependencies between the system and its components, overlapping data
instead of independent data should be used in the analysis. Therefore, in this re-
search, only data drawn simultaneously from the same system are used for inference.
The dependencies between higher-level failure data and lower-level failure data are
characterized by the conditional probabilities in a BN model; therefore, the objec-
tive of Chapter 3 is to infer the parameters of a Bayesian network given overlapping
pass/fail data. In the independent data case, the likelihood is a multiplication of in-
dividual likelihood data coming from each component. However, in the incomplete
simultaneous data case the likelihood function of evidence becomes a summation of
several likelihoods that correspond to all possible state vectors of the system. For
such complicated function, it is impossible to find a closed form solution of poste-
rior probability; therefore, the computational Bayesian method, MCMC is employed.
The resulting method is successful at quantifying system reliability structure with in-
complete data. A MATLAB program is developed to perform compilation of the set
of combinations of state vectors to be used in the MCMC simulation in WinBUGS.
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Chapter 4 extends the work in Chapter 3 to systems with continuous likelihood
data. A Bayesian network model has been developed for overlapping lifetime data
at various levels within a complex system. A key aspect of this methodology is its
ability to incorporate overlapping data. An overlapping data likelihood function is
developed using d-separation in the Bayesian network model. The model developed
highlights the effect of the information overlapping data contains and how it can be
used to correctly improve our state of knowledge (which is the set of component reli-
ability characteristics parameters). The resulting method completely incorporates all
information taking into account the dependencies imposed by the system structure.
Chapter 5 proposes a fully Bayesian model for incorporating expert opinions with
different precision and offers several advantages over other existing models. Among
these are an efficient Bayesian framework for incorporating multiple sources of prior
information through the treatment of expert opinion as imprecisely-observed data
(also called pseudo data), and evaluating the experts’ precision with a weight parame-
ter assigned as a random variable in the model. Proposed method provides efficiency
in calculations, avoiding the computational complexity posed by the pooling meth-
ods proposed in the literature.
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research
The discussions at the end of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have
addressed some future research directions. We organize those that are promising and
suggest other possibilities.
In system reliability, the first goal is to address more complex and general sys-
tems. As discussed previously, we can extend the proposed methods to more com-
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plex systems by modeling the relationship between different levels. If we model a
very complex system using a large BN, we would have too many parameters as the
complexity of systems increases because there would be too many nodes and param-
eters. As a result, it would be interesting to address assessing system reliabilities for a
very complex Bayesian network and develop more efficient algorithms for inference.
Developing more efficient simulation techniques for the proposed models is there-
fore very crucial. In this direction, further work could be done to propose better
MCMC algorithms, especially for overlapping data.
One of the promising areas for BN related applications is safety assessment of
software based systems. Software reliability is very challenging to compute, since
many of the aspects of the software are not directly measurable. Therefore, BNs
could be used to model software based systems to constitute a systematic way to
combine quantitative reliability data with qualitative data and show the link between
these components. The BN methodology can provide a useful and practical frame-
work that supports decision-making in software engineering because of the ease of
representation of causal relationships among variables (Fenton et al., 2008; Fenton
and Neil, 2012). Lewis (1999) discussed some of the issues surrounding Bayesian net-
work software process modeling and outlined directions for future research. Dahll
(2000) discussed how to combine disparate sources of information in the safety as-
sessment of software-based systems using Bayesian networks. Bibi and Stamelos
(2004) suggested the use of Bayesian networks for representing software process
models. Misirli and Bener (2014) investigated the applications of Bayesian networks
in software engineering in terms of techniques used to learn causal relationships
among variables and techniques used to infer the parameters. They proposed a hy-
brid BN to improve evidence-based decision-making in software engineering, show-
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ing that hybrid BNs are powerful frameworks that combine expert knowledge with
quantitative data.
Bayesian networks can provide a network of software work flows and their in-
terdependencies. They are highly visual tools that can indicate which work flows
affect others. They enable evolution of the process as they can be used for sensi-
tivity analysis in order to explore the impact of some changes in software process
before actually implementing them. To satisfy this objective, the software process
needs to be analyzed and carefully modeled in order to encourage it’s understanding,
assessment and improvement. Therefore, it would be a good research direction to
develop generic Bayesian network process models for software based systems.
Another future research area is assessing prior distributions from experts and
combining these distributions. In real life, we might get very complex distributions,
so it would be an interesting research direction and more work could be done on
how to assess the hyperparameters of different prior distributions.
MCMC simulation techniques were used all throughout this dissertation. Further
work could be done on inference for Bayesian networks using other approximation
techniques.
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